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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists, Cleveland Local

'
'
i
'
i

and
National Broadcasting Company, Inc.,
Owner and Operator of Television
Station WKYC-TV
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Award

'
_

_

'!

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties and dated 1972 - 1975 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, Awards as
follows:
The Company's hiring of David McCormick as Executive Producer and his performance of the duties of
that position insofar as they include producing the
6 P.M. Monday through Friday News Program of Station
WKYC constitute ,; a violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties. The grievance is sustained and Mr. McCormick is directed
either to become and remain a member of AFTRA, in
accordance with Article I of the contract within 30
days of the date of this Award or to forthwith cease
and desist from performing the duties of News Producer of the 6 P.M. Monday through Friday Television
News Program of Station WKYC.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June 27, 1974
STATE OF New York )Q G •
COUNTY OF New York)
'
On this 27th
and appeared Eric
be the individual
instrument and he

day of June, 1974, before me personally came
J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
described in and who executed the foregoing
acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 52 30 0105 73

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists, Cleveland Local
and

'

Opinion

National Broadcasting Company, Inc.
Owner and Operator of Television
Station WKYC-TV

In accordance with Article X of the Collective

Bargaining

Agreement dated 1972 - 1975 between National Broadcasting Company, Inc., Owner and Operator of Television Station WKYC-TV,
and American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Cleveland Local, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator
to hear and decide the following stipulated issue;
Did the Company's hiring of David McCormick as
Executive Producer and his performance of the
duties of that position constitute a violation
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between
the parties?
Hearings were held in Cleveland, Ohio on July 9, September
5 and 6, November 14, 1973 and January 2 and 3, 1974.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties

filed post hearing briefs.
The American Federation of Television and Radio Artists,
Cleveland Local (AFTRA or the Union), is the collective bargaining representative of certain employees of the National
Broadcasting Company News Bureau in Cleveland, Ohio (NBC or
the Company).

At issue here is whether the duties and functions

of the News Producer of the regular 6 P.M. Monday through Friday news program constitute work of the bargaining unit repre-

- 2 sented by AFTRA and, more specifically, whether Mr. David
McCormick, who was hired by NBC on April 16, 1973, as an Executive Producer and whose duties include producing the 6 P.M. news
program, should, by reason of that fact be required to join the
Union, or in the alternative be required to cease performing
that work.
The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties
for the period 1972 - 1975 includes a Recognition and Union
Shop clause (Article I) which reads, in pertinent part, as
follows :
"A. This Agreement applies to all staff performers,
including staff announcers, staff newsmen,
staff singers and staff actors employed by the
Company at the Station, all of the above named
persons being hereinafter referred to collectively as artists ..."
The quoted language of Article IA is amplified in Section
1 of Schedule I of the Contract which reads, in pertinent part,
as follows :
"A. Artists employed by the Company under this Schedule I shall be classified as follows:
1. Staff Announcers (hereinafter called Announcer)
2. Staff Newswriters , Editors, Reporters and Newscasters (hereinafter called Newsman)
3. Part- time Announcers, etc.
4. Trainees, etc.

"C. Announcers are those artists whose duties are
referred to in Section 2A. Newsmen are those
artists whose duties are referred to in Section 4."
Schedule I Section 4 of the contract provides as follows:

- 3 "Newsmen's duties - Newsmen may be required to
render any or all of such services as newsmen
have been in the practice of rendering and such
other services as the program requirements of
the Company may necessitate and as are consonant with their employment as newsmen."
Section 5 of Schedule I deals with Newsmen's Wages.

Three

paragraphs of Section 5, paragraphs D., E. and F., are of interest here; they read as follows:
"D. Newsmen may also be required to perform news
programs and other programs for which their
skills may properly qualify them. For the
performances of such programs, they shall,
in addition to salary, be paid the same fee
to which announcers are entitled under this
Agreement.
"E. At the discretion of the Company, a newsman
may be assigned permanent supervisory duties
for which he would be compensated at a rate
of $7.50 per week above his base salary.
"F. Newsmen assigned as TV Producers or Assignment
Editors shall be paid a fee of not less than
$5.00 per day for each day of assignment. Such
fee shall not be credited against the guarantee."
To summarize, the contract applies to staff announcers,
newsmen, singers and actors employed by NBC at Station WKYC-TV
in Cleveland and these persons are sometimes referred to
collectively as "artists."
The contract is so structured as to consist of a main body
of eighteen articles having general application to all artists
employed at Station WKYC-TV and separate schedules containing
more specific provisions applicable to particular categories
of artists.
Schedule I of the contract, according to Section I thereof,
deals with those artists who fall within the categories of
1. Announcer, 2. Newsmen, 3. Part-time Announcers and Newsman

- 4 4. Trainees-Announcer/Newsmen.
The rubric "Newsmen" as used in the contract includes
artists employed as Newswriters, Editors, Reporters and Newscasters.

Section 1 of Schedule I, generally speaking, thus iden-

tifies the particular artists with which the Schedule deals.
The next six Sections of the Schedule (2 through 7), contain
special provisions applicable to the four separate categories of
artists covered by the Schedule.

Sections 2 and 3 deal with

Duties, Wages, etc., of Announcers; Sections 4 and 5 deal with
Duties, Wages, etc., of Newsmen; Section 6 deals with Part-time
Announcers and Newsmen; and Section 7 deals with Trainee Announcers and Newsmen.

The balance of the seventeen Sections which

make up Schedule I are of general application to all four categories of artists covered by the Schedule.
A.
The Positions of the Parties
AFTRA alleges that insofar as Mr. David McCormick was hired
as a managerial employee assigned to perform the work of a Producer the hiring was in violation of the contract between the
parties.

It is the Union's position that producing duties fall

within the area of Newsmen's duties; that they are, consequently,
covered by the contract and must be performed by unit members.
The Union contends, therefore, that while management may create
managerial titles and hire non-union members to fill them, it
may not assign unit duties to such titles nor hire non-union employees to perform them.

It concludes that as the Producer of

the regularly scheduled daily 6:00 P.M. newscast, Mr. McCormick

- 5 should join the Union; or in the alternative that if because of
his otherwise managerial status he cannot join the Union, his
assignment to the duties of a news program Producer should be
terminated.
NBC argues first, that the function of a

local television

news producer is supervisory in nature and is not covered by
the contract; and, second, that even if local television news
producing is covered by the contract, AFTRA members have no
exclusive right to perform such duties.
AFTRA maintains that historically the production of news
programs at Station WKYC and its predecessors, KYW and WTAM, including the news program which is broadcast at 6:00 P.M., Monday through Friday, and which is currently produced by Executive
Producer McCormick, is and has been the work of AFTRA members.
The history of the performance of producers' duties is traced
by the Union "from time immemorial" through the period prior to
1956 when the Station was owned by NBC and operated under the
call letters WTAM; through a nine-year period of ownership by
Westinghouse Broadcasting Company when the station was known as
KYW; and through the current period of resumed NBC ownership
commencing in 1965, at which time the station assumed its present call letters.

During all of this time, the Union contends,

AFTRA members performed the duties of news program Producers
although the term "Producer" was not always used.

In this

connection, the Union maintains that "the term 'Producer' evolved from that of 'news editor' and plain 'editor,'" and that the
terms have been used interchangeably„

- 6 The history of the station, including the performance of
producing duties by AFTRA members variously styled as Editors,
News Editors or Producers, is supported, the Union points out,
by the testimony not only of witnesses for the Union but by
Company witnesses as well.

The Union shows that among the latter

category of witnesses was James Keelor who was hired as a Producer and who served in that capacity for more than three years,
from April 1969 to July 1972, during all of which time he was
an AFTRA member and a unit employee.
Considerable attention was given by the Union in the evidence presented in the hearings, and in the argument in its
brief, to the contention that historically and at all times
prior to the appointment of Mr. McCormick, the functions and
duties of Producer were performed by persons who had none of the
attributes of supervisory or managerial personnel.

They could

not discipline, hire or fire other newsroom employees; in fact,
argues the Union, in the case of the witness Cole, who was also
hired, not assigned, as a

Producer, the attempt to exercise

such authority earned him a reprimand.

Although there was some

dispute as to whether he was reprimanded in the full and formal
sense of the word, it appears quite clear that management rejected and disapproved his attempted exercise of supervisory
authority.
Finally, while conceding, as NBC claims, that there were
instances in which non-union employees performed the duties of
Producers, the Union explains however, that these were either
isolated incidents of relatively short duration, of which the

- 7 Union was unaware, or special cases such as the production of
election broadcasts; and that in the latter instances AFTRA
employees actually worked on the production of the programs
under close supervision of a specially assigned management employee, an arrangement attributable to the exceptional importance of election news coverage.
Thus, the Union's case rests on the contentions that;
1. AFTRA Newsmen have always performed producing
duties at Station WKYC, including previously the
news program in dispute.
2. The isolated instances in which such duties were
performed by non-union employees were inconsistent with the well-established pattern and were
therefore atypical; and
3. Producers are not supervisory jobs, but rather
covered by the bargaining unit because they have
not exercised supervisory authority or managerial
powers such as those with which Mr. McCormick is
vested.
NBC bases its defense in this matter on two main contentions which, in essence, must be viewed as alternatives.

The

Company maintains, in the first instance, that the function of
"a television news Producer . . . is supervisory in nature and
is not covered by the contract."

In the Company's second line

of defense, it is maintained that even if the functions of television news Producers are covered by the contract, such work is
not exclusively within the domain of AFTRA members.

- 8 In support of its first argument, NBC makes a number of
points.

It asserts that the testimony of numerous witnesses

for both sides demonstrates that the work of a Producer is
supervisory in nature, and that its Producers are vested with
full supervisory authority, discretion and decision making
powers.
NBC also shows, in connection with its first main argument, that in general usage in the broadcasting industry,
Producers are considered to be supervisory and managerial employees; two NLRB decisions of similar effect are cited on
this point.
Next, the NBC brief argues that because the contract makes
separate and special provision for the payment to Newsmen
assigned as Producers of a supervisory fee of $7.50 per week
(Contract Schedule I, Section 5E)as well as a minimum of $5.00
per day (Schedule I, Section 5F), it demonstrates that when
assigned as Producers, Newsmen are supervisory employees.

*
On its second point, NBC notes that although Schedule I
Section 1A of the contract covers "Staff Newswriters, Editors,
Reporters and Newscasters (hereinafter called Newsmen)," it
makes no mention of Producers.
The Company concludes therefore that even if AFTRA members have performed the duties of Producers and even if the
performance of such duties is covered by the contract, Producer duties are not exclusively the work of AFTRA unit members.

In this connection, the Company contends that in the

last contract negotiations AFTRA sought an exclusive duties

- 9 clause which would have identified Producer duties as unit
work but failed to obtain such a clause.

Pointing to the lang-

uage of Section 4, Schedule I ("Newsmen's Duties") which reads
in pertinent part;
"Newsmen may be required to render . . . such services as newsmen have been in the practice of
rendering . . .";
the Company argues that:
". . . the word 'shall,1 the traditional term of
obligation, is conspicuous by its absence from
this provision.

The operative term in the "News-

men's Duties' provision is the permissive term
'may.'

When used in contracts in (this) fasbion

. . . the term 'may' means that which can occur,
not that which must occur.

'May' also obviously

implies 'may not.'"
The Company brief goes on to say that "it is NBC's position that it has no contractual obligation to assign producing
work to AFTRA members . . . " and that although "NBC does not
deny that AFTRA-represented Newsmen have in the past been
assigned . . . as local News Producers . . . this . . . is
only the dead hand of history, not the living mandate of contractual

obligation."
Discussion

There can be no question that the contract is unclear.
This is demonstrated by the fact that five days of hearings, a
record of 844 pages, the testimony of twelve witnesses and numerous exhibits were required to establish facts relevant to an

- 10 interpretation of the contract.

AFTRA cannot point to clear

contract language which prescribes that producing duties are
the work of Newsmen.

On the other hand, however, NBC cannot

clearly demonstrate by contract language that producing duties
are not covered by the contract.
1. that it covers "Newsmen"

The contract says;
(Article I);

2. that "Newsmen are those (Schedule I, Sec. l.C)
artists whose duties are referred to in (Schedule I)
Section 4"; and
3. that "Newsmen's duties (Schedule I, Sec. 4) consist of "such services as Newsmen have been in
the practice of rendering".

. . (Emphasis added)

Thus the contract by its express terms directs us to
"practice," and the "dead hand of history" which the Company argues should be disregarded is therefore a vital factor in the
interpretation of the contract and the only guide provided by
the contract in determining what duties it covers.

That guide

is sufficient to establish that the contract covers Newsmen and
Newsmen's Duties and that Newsmenf's duties include all duties
which "Newsmen have been in practice of rendering."

Since the

record establishes and NBC concedes that Newsmen have been in
the practice of rendering Producer duties for many years, it
follows that Producer duties are Newsmen's duties and that Producers' duties are, therefore, when assigned to newsmen covered
by the contract.
NBC maintains, however, that even if such a finding is
made it cannot be held that there is any exclusive right to have
these duties performed by unit employees, because first, they are
supervisory both in fact and as a matter of law and therefore

- 11 properly assignable as well and have been assigned to managerial
employees.

And second, that the history of bargaining shows that

the Union sought, but failed to obtain exclusive jurisdiction
over this type of work.
Examination of the record and particularly the specific
testimony on the first point shows that much of that testimony
is subjective in nature.

The probative testimony in this area

demonstrates that the Producer performs a vital function and
one requiring high level expertise, diverse skills and considerable judgment.

It does not show, however, that the employees

who have regularly served in performing the bulk of television
news producing duties over the years have regularly exercised
the full spectrum of duties traditionally associated with supervisory rank.

This is particularly significant in light of

the sizable body of testimony showing that producers at WKYC
have not had such supervisory powers and duties.

Taken together,

the testimony on this point persuades me that the function of New
Producer as it has evolved at Station WKYC is analogous to that
of a "group leader." (Indeed, Company witness Keelor likened the
job to the "quarterback" of the team.)
This view is borne out by evidence of management's practice, in different circumstances, such as the production of
special election coverage broadcasts, of assigning managerial
employees such as News Managers Albert, Reid, and Keelor and
News Director Wetzel to supervise the production of news specials dealing with elections and national political conventions.
Whatever the duties of Producers may be elsewhere in the
broadcast industry and however supervisory those duties may be

- 12 generally and in the specific instances dealt with in the
cited NLRB decisions, the question of the supervisory authority
of Producers at WKYC is what is at issue here.

The authorities

cited say in substance, 1. that Producers generally have certain
powers; and 2. that given such powers, Producers are supervisors.
The evidence in this case shows that such powers are not exercised by the employees who have served as News Producers at
Station WKYC.

In short though the employees dealt with here

have the same title as the employees discussed in NBC's excerpts
from News From Nowhere, Epstein (Random House, 1973), perform
some of the same duties; and bear some similarlity to the employees covered by the cited NLRB decisions, I conclude they
lack much of the essential authority attributed to producers
generally in the Epstein book and crucial to the NLRB decisions.
Therefore the quoted material from Mr. Epstein's book and
the cited decisions, must be deemed inopposite and undeteroiinative.
The Union's contention that policy and decision making
functions are performed by higher authority and that the Producer has no part in these matters except the implementation of the
policies and decisions thus formulated, is supported by the evidence.

The testimony shows not only that management is able to

dictate how a Producer is to perform his duties in a routine
broadcast such as the five day a week 6;00 P.M. newscast but
that matters can be routinized to such an extent that in the
relatively simple format of weekend newscasts the shows can be
broadcast without a producer.

It is consistent with this testi-

mony and with the Union's contention that management has been
able to order its affairs in this manner and has done so, to

- 13 conclude that precisely because this has been the pattern of
WKYC, management finds it necessary only in the extraordinary
circumstances attendant upon election newscasts or national
convention coverage to specially assign a managerial employee.
It should be obvious therefore that so far as the instant
case is concerned, I make a distinction between the work of a
Producer on a regularly scheduled news program such as the one
in dispute herein, and work as Producer of special programs
such as national political conventions and election newscasts.
The latter, because of unique and possibly unpredictable conditions, and because discretionary and non-routine decisions
may be required both frequently and speedily, the assignment of
a managerial employee as the Producer is both understandable
and proper.

But those unusual programs, which the Company has

shown have been produced by managerial employees are, in my
judgment and based on this record, so different from the news
programs of the type in dispute here, as to not constitute a
relevant exception to the otherwise unvaried practice of
assigning bargaining unit members as producers of regular news
programs.

And in the absence of relevant contrary circumstance

that practice stands traditionally as persuasive evidence of
what the contract means, especially where, as here the contract
language is imprecise.
The fact that in assigning a Newsman as a Producer NBC
binds itself under the contract to pay, inter alia, a supervisory fee and that, as the evidence shows, Newsmen so assigned
have received that fee does not mean that the duties are supervisory within the meaning of the labor law or as legally exclud

- 14 ed from coverage by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.

Rather, considering the factual nature of the responsibil-

ities performed as adduced in this record, the "supervisory"
function covered by Section 5, Schedule I, and for which additional compensation is paid, means, just as logically the
assumption of the supervision and direction of other bargaining unit employees, as a "group leader"(or "quarterback".)

And

though such includes some "supervisory" responsibilities, it is
well within the frame of bargaining unit jurisdiction as determined by law, and not, in the absence of supervisory powers and
authority raised to a supervisory/managerial level by the mere
payment of a "supervisory" stipend,
AFTRA's unsuccessful attempt to negotiate an exclusive
duties clause is not as neatly dispositive of the questions
presented in this matter as NBC suggests.

For, in effect, the

NBC argument asks us to ignore what the contract does say
because of what it does not say.

The addition to the contract

of any exclusive duties clause, covering any of the duties
which Newsmen have been in the practice of rendering, would
constitute no more than an explicit guarantee of&hat which is
already there, albeit impliedly.

And considering the entire

record I cannot conclude that AFTRA's attempt to obtain an unequivocal guarantee that could not be misconstrued by the Company or an arbitrator, is an admission that it did not have
interpretative exclusive jurisdiction over the work.
The recognition clause of the contract guarantees AFTRA's
jurisdiction over the position of Newsmen.
ly list the duties of that job.

It does not explicit-

But it defines the duties as

- 15 "such services as newsmen have been in the practice of rendering."

I conclude therefore that the duties of a newsman are

within the Union's exclusive jurisdiction as is the job title.
Since employees hired as Newsmen must join the Union within
thirty days, it follows logically that an employee hired to perform such services must join the Union as well.

Those services,

as has been stated, include the performance of TV news producing duties.
I do not construe the contract's use of the work "may" as
does NBC.

As has been stated above, Producer duties are cov-

ered by the contract.

The use of the word "may" in Schedule I,

Section 4 (Newsmen's Duties) does not negate that fact.

Nor,

in my view, should it be read, as NBC suggests, to mean that
any of the duties which Newsmen have been in the practice of
rendering may or may not be assigned to AFTRA represented Newsmen but also may or may not be assigned to non-members of AFTRA.
On the contrary, I find that such an interpretation would require reading into the contract, language which is not there.
To do so would be in violation of Article X of the contract
which provides, in pertinent part;
" . . . the Arbitrator shall not add to, subtract from, or vary the terms of this Agreement. "
Mindful of that injunction, I read Section 4 of Schedule
I of the contract to mean that any Newsman may be required to
perform any of the duties which Newsmen have been in the practice of rendering.

This does not mean that all Newsmen must

perform, or must be assigned, to all duties that have ever1 been
performed by Newsmen.

But it does mean, read in the context

of the entire contract, that when such duties are to be per-

- 16 formed they are to be performed by Newsmen.

Management's dis-

cretion in this regard does not extend to the point, which it
claims, of deciding whether a unit or non-unit employee shall
be assigned to such duties.

That discretion is confined to deter-

mining which Newsmen shall be so assigned.
Applying the above-stated conclusions as to the meaning of
the contract to the circumstances of the instant case, I find
that Newsmen, including but not limited to the witnesses Mosbrook,
Smith and Keelor, have regularly performed the duties of Producers of television news programs at Station WKYC, including
but not limited to the 6:00 P.M. Monday to Friday news program,
in various titles, including the title "Producer," and that such
duties as they pertain to news programs of the type in dispute
here are covered by the contract.

I find further that in the

context of the entire contract, such duties may be assigned to
any Newsman covered by the contract but may not be assigned to
an employee who is not a member of the unit covered by the contract.

I therefore find that the Company's assignment of pro-

ducing the 6;00 P.M. Monday through Friday television news program to Executive Producer David McCormick a non-unit management
employee, was in violation of the contract.

y
. Schmertz
Arbitrator

y

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of the Arbitration
between
Manchester Education Association

Opinion
and
Award

and
New Hampshire Education Association
The stipulated issues are:
1.

Were certain persons improperly denied an
absentee ballot and as a result where they
improperly denied an opportunity to vote?

2.

Were certain absentee ballots cast, properly excluded from the count?

3.

Were certain persons who attempted to vote,
properly excluded from doing so?

The parties stipulated that the Arbitrator is authorized
to fashion a remedy if and where appropriate.
Hearings were held in Manchester, New Hampshire on March
30 and June 18, 1974, at which time representatives of the
Manchester Education Association (MEA) and the New Hampshire
Education Association (NHEA) appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
From time to time an arbitration case comes along where
the traditional rules of contract law are applicable, legally
and equitably.

This is such a case.

An agreement was reached

by persons who appeared to have authority; a material consideration of the agreement upon which the aggrieved party relied,
failed; and the aggrieved party ~ •

is entitled to a remedy

as close to specific performance as is practicable.

- 2 Prior to the instant disputed NHEA president-elect election
held on October 19, 1973, certain difficulties and disagreements
existed between the MEA and the NHEA, which seriously jeopardized
the continued affiliation or re-affiliation of the MEA and the
NHEA.
I find that just prior to the election, in an effort to
either resolve those difficulties or provide a basis to do so,
representatives of both groups reached an oral agreement (on or
about October 9, 1973), a material consideration of which was an
| assurance by the NHEA that MEA members who signed "three way
cards" (thereby becoming or renewing their membership in the

j
|| NHEA) would enjoy full voting rights in the up-coming NHEA president-elect election.And that included the right to cast absentee
I ballots regardless of any NHEA constitutional or by-law provision, which, because of restricted time limits, would otherwise
j have barred the casting of absentee ballots.
I find that the Executive Director of the NHEA gave such a
direct assurance or made statements to the MEA from which the
j] MEA reasonably and logically concluded that such assurance was
l|
I

!|

a material condition of the agreement.
I conclude that the MEA as an entity, its Executive Committee, and its membership relied on that material condition. I
consider it immaterial that the NHEA Executive Director may not
have had the authority to give such an assurance or waive or ex-

| tend the constitutional time limit beyond which an absentee
ballot could not be cast.

For in my judgment, based on the facts

as presented in this case, and especially the details of the

- 3 negotiations leading to the October 9 agreement and the particular inquiry which the MEA Executive Committee made of the NHEA
Executive Director on October 9, regarding the voting rights of
the MEA members, before approving the agreement, the Executive
Director acted with "apparent" authority to make the commitment
and I cannot fault the MEA for relying thereon.
However, this material consideration, namely the right of
II
the MEA members who signed three way cards to vote, either in
person or by absentee ballot in the then up-coming NHEA president!i

elect election, and without which I am persuaded there would

l||j

have been no agreement between the MEA and the NHEAS failed.

!jji

Shortly before the election, on advice of counsel and following

j!
;!

an objection from one of the president-elect candidates, the
NHEA Executive Director informed the MEA that the constitutional
time limit for casting absentee ballots could not be waived or
extended and that therefore several hundred MEA member absentee
ballots either then executed or thereafter delivered by the MEA
to the NHEA office and to the polling place could not be included in the count, and no more applications for absentee ballots "Would be honored.
Though the Executive Director of the NHEA and his staff
made a determined and good faith effort to notify MEA members
that absentee ballots would not be accepted, but that they could
travel to the polling place and vote in person, a considerable
amount of confusion resulted.

Because of the short period of

time available that confusion could not be dispelled.

As a

consequence I am persuaded that MEA members who executed absentee

-4-

ballots and whose membership cards were punched, believed that
they could no longer vote, even in person, and therefore did
note vote.

I am persuaded that many MEA members cast absentee

ballots on the strength of the October 9 agreement because they
could not travel to the polling place to vote in person, and
were disenfranchised when their absentee ballots were invalidated
I am persuaded that some MEA members were denied absentee
ballots and thus disenfranchised.

And there is evidence

that some eligible MEA members who appeared at the polling
place were not able to vote.

Generally it is my conclusion

that the NHEA decision not to accept or include several hundred
absentee ballots from MEA members was a material breach of,
and a failure of a material condition of the agreement reached
between the MEA and NHEA.

And I am satisfied that the outcome

of the president-elect election might well have been affected,
had the absentee ballots been included in the count and had
MEA members otherwise eligible to vote not been so disenfranchised
Accordingly, in material degrees, certain persons were
improperly denied an opportunity

to vote; certain absentee

ballots cast were improperly excluded from the count and
certain persons who attempted to vote were improperly excluded
from doing so.

Therefore the stipulated issues are factually

answered in favor of the MEA.

-5The MEA is entitled to a remedy.

In my judgement the only

meaningful remedy is to invalidate the instant disputed election
and order a new, substitute election, which will accord all
eligible voters full opportunity to vote either in person or
by absentee ballot.

I am mindful of some of the difficulties

that the incumbent may be defeated and unable to return
to his teaching job until his leave of absence is completed;
that a different successful candidate may not be able to
immediately assume the Presidency full time; that in any event
within a matter of months (in March or April of 1975) another
regular president-elect election will take place pursuant to
the constitution and by-laws and that two such elections within
that short span of time may be unsettling; and that a new
election, which must be state-wide, will involve other local
teacher groups affiliated with the NHEA, other than the MEA.
But on balance these difficulties, as real as they may be, do
not in my view outweigh the right of the MEA to get the election
for which it bargained, for which it presumably gave a monetary
consideration in the form of membership dues paid or payable
to the NHEA, and for which an agreement of continued affiliation
with the NHEA was primarily based.

The only other possible

remedy would be some form of money damages or monetary restitution.

That form of remedy I deem neither sufficiently remedial

nor economically practicable.

Most important however I do not

consider it in the furtherance of what I think is an objective
essential to the interests of the organized teachers, namely
the maintenance

or re-establishment of an affiliated relation-

ship between the MEA and the NHEA.

-6Accordingly it is my AWARD that

Provided the MEA becomes or remains
affiliated with the NHEA,
1.

The president-elect election of
October 19, 1973 is set aside.

2.

A new, substitute election shall
be held under the election provisions
of the NHEA constitution and by-laws
as soon as practicable and agreeable,
but not later than during October, 1974.
The successful candidate in that election shall assume the office involved
for the balance of the term, or until
July 1, 1975.

3.

The election ordered by this AWARD
shall be administered in its entirety
by the Election Department of the
American Arbitration Association (as
distinguished from asking the American
Arbitration Association to merely
certify the count of the ballots).

4.

The Undersigned retains jurisdiction in
this matter, for implementation of the
AWARD and to resolve any disputes or
questions which may arise therefrom.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
Dated: July 31, 1974
STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK) ' ' "
On this thirty-first day of July, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communication Workers of America
AFL-CIO
-and-

OPINION
and
AWARD

New York Telephone Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discharge of Charles Heissenbuttel
without proper reason under Article 10 of
the contract?
Hearings were held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on July 23rd and July 24th, 1974 at
which time representatives of the above named parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The arbitrator's

oath was expressly waived.
Under the terms of Artcle 10 the authority of the
\r is limited to either upholding the discharge or
reversing it in its entirety.

The Arbitrator is not authorized

to reduce the discharge to any lesser penalty even if he concludes that some disciplinary penalty short of discharge is
proper.

Therefore unless the instant discharge was fort proper

reasons the grievant must be reinstated and reimbursed in
accordance with Section 10.03 of the contract.
A careful review of the entire record persuades me that
the Company's case falls just short of establishing proper
reasons for the ultimate penalty of dismissal.

-2As an authoratative Company witness testified, the
grievant was discharged for "altercation and falsification."
More specifically the Company charges him with engaging in
a fight, in which he was the aggressor, with a fellow employee.
And thereafter refusing to disclose to the Company that a fight
had taken place and falsely claiming an injury which he sustained
in or as a consequence of the fight as an "on the job injury."
The Company asserts that the grievant clung to his false story
though given an opportunity to tell the truth, and only finally
disclosed the fact that a fight took place subsequent to that
opportunity.
The evidence in the record does not establish that the
grievant was the aggressor in the fight.
otherwise.

The grievant testified

He asserts that the other employee, Mel Scarpatti,

first abused him verbally on an intercom system and thereafter
without provocation assaulted him in the break room.

His

testimony was not significantly shaken on cross-examination.
If there were witnesses to the fight none were called to testify.
Most important, Scarpatti, though still in the Company's employ
and available, was not called to refute the grievant's testimony.
I do not consider the writeen report which Scarpatti gave to
the Company as sufficiently probative to overturn the grievant's
direct testimony, especially when he could have been called to
testify.

So the Company's burden to establish the principal

charge against the grievant regarding the fight has not been

-3met by the requisite standard of proof.
There is no question that the grievant refused to disclose
that a fight had taken place and persisted in that refusal
despite the opportunities the Company gave him to disclose the
1 truth.

And there is no question that he falsified his injury

as job-connected.

In my judgement a failure or refusal of an

employee to cooperate honestly with his employer in an investigation surrounding an injury and the making of a false report
concerning how the injury occurred could be proper reasons for
discharge unless the employee offered some believable mitigating
explanation, and especially if the employee significantly benefited
jj from his lack of candor.

And even if he offered a mitigating

II

•:

j
!

explanation or if he in no way benefited therefrom a disciplinary j
-.

penalty short of dismissal would be warranted under a different

:

!| contractual relationship which permitted the Arbitrator to
fashion that remedy.
I find a mitigating explanation which stands uncontroverted.
The grievant testified that Scarpatti pleaded with him, in the
interest of the latter's job security, not to disclose that a
fight had taken place.

Again Scarpatti was not called to

testify in refutation, and again the grievant's testimony was
not impeached in cross-examination.

Indeed, that testimony is

consistent with a finding of fact that Scarpatti, rather than
the grievant was the aggressor.
Nor do I find that the grievant gained any significant
benefit from his false assertion that the injury above his eye
was an on-the-job injury.

The Company suggests it might have

been liable under a Workmen's Compensation claim.

Yet the

-4grievant did not file for compensation and testified that he had
no intention to do so.

In view of my finding that the grievant

was not the aggressor but rather was subject to a surprise and
unprovoked assault by Scarpatti it is unlikely, under those
facts, that the grievant would have been subject to discharge.
And hence it cannot be argued that the benefit he sought by
falsifying the events was his own job protection.
The only benefit which grievant obtained was two days
pay for the days he was out, which he received on the assumption
that the injury was job connected.

I do not consider this to

be the type of benefit which raises the grievant's offense to
the level of misconduct warranting a discharge.

And, considering

the apparent concession that he would not have been entitled to
that pay under the true circumstances of his injury, I do not
consider it inconsistent with the arbitrator's authority under
Article 10 to authorize the Company to recoup those two days
pay from the grievant following his reinstatement.

I shall so

provide in my Award.
Again I wish to make clear that in this case, had I the
authority, I would have imposed on the grievant a lengthy
disciplinary suspension.

But I am unable to conclude, based on

the record before me, that the facts constitute proper reason
for the extreme penalty of dismissal.

In the absence of counter-

vailing evidence and testimony I accept the grievant's statements
regarding the fight and his explanation as to why he did not
truthfully disclose what took place.

This conclusion is not

overturned by the fact that on cross-examination he did not

-5fully state the various employers for whom he had previously
worked.

The fact is that he listed all such employers on his

employment application; that that application was not falsified,
and that so far as the record before us is concerned there is
nothing about his former employment history which he had any
reason to hide.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
There was not proper reason for the
discharge of Charles Heissenbuttel. As
mandated by Article 10 of the contract
he must be reinstated and reimbursed in
accordance with Section 10.03. However
subsequent to his reinstatement the
Company may recoup from Mr. Heissenbuttel
an amount of money equivalent to the two
days pay which he would have not received
had the true facts concerning his injury
been known.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September
, 1974
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this <^"^
day of September, 1974, before mfe personall
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
t

Air Line pilots Association

'
i

and

i

Award

Overseas National Airways, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties and dated February 5, 1971 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties, Award
as follows:
1. The Company did not violate Sections 3, 16 and
27 of the Agreement or the side letter dated
August 26, 1971 in paying Clifton B. Bannerman
DC-9 Co-Pilot's pay from March 19, 1973 to July
21, 1973. The Union's grievance, as it relates
to that period of time, is denied.
2. The Company violated Section 16(B) of the Agreement in paying the grievant DC-9 Co-Pilot1s pay
from July 21, 1973 to October 19, 1973. The
Union's grievance as it relates to that period
of time, is granted. During that period of time
Mr. Bannerman was entitled to and should have
been paid the Electra Captain's (L188) rate of
pay pursuant to the pay schedule of Section 3
of the contract. The Company shall make an
appropriate adjustment in his pay for that period of time.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

Frank Foster
Concurring in #2 above
Dissenting from #1 above

Gerald Smallwood
Concurring in #2 above
Dissenting from #1 above

Richard Elten
Concurring in #1 above
Dissenting from #2 above

Melvin Sibulkin
Concurring in #1 above
Dissenting from #2 above
-i,
DATED: May'
1974
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this \ly day of May, 1974 before me personally came and
appeared Eric- J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: May
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1974

On this
day of May,
appeared Frank Foster to me
individual described in and
ment and he acknowledged to

DATED: May
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1974, before me personally came and
known and known to me to be the
who executed the foregoing instrume that he executed the same.

1974

On this
day of May, 1974, before me personally came and
appeared Gerald Smallwood to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED: May
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1974

On this
day of May, 1974, before me personally came and
appeared Richard Elten to me known and known to me to be the
individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0

DATED: May
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1974

On this
day of May,
appeared Melvin Sibulkin to
individual described in and
ment and he acknowledged to

1974, before me personally came and
me known and known to me to be the
who executed the foregoing instrume that he executed the same.

Case # N Y-93-73

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots Association
and

Opinion
of
Chairman

Overseas National Airways, Inc.

In accordance with the Arbitration Provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated February 5, 1971, between Overseas National Airways, Inc., hereinafter referred
to as the "Company," and Air Line Pilots Association, International, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the
Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of a five member
Board of Arbitration to hear and decide, together with the
Union and Company designees to that Board, the following
stipulated issue;
Was the Company in violation of Sections 3, 16
and 27 of the Agreement and the side letter dated
August 26, 1971 in paying Clifton B. Bannerman
DC-9 Co-Pilot's pay from March 19, 1973 to October
19, 1973? If so, what shall be the remedy?
Messrs. Frank Foster and Gerald Smallwood served as the
Union Arbitrators on the Board of Arbitration, and Messrs.
Richard Elten and Melvin Sibulkin served as the Company Arbitrators on the Board of Arbitration.
A hearing was held at the Company offices on April 11,
1974 at which time Mr. Bannerman, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.

The

Board of Arbitration met in executive session on May 2, 1974,

- 2 I conclude that the grievant was properly paid for the
period March 19, 1973 to July 21, 1973; but was not properly
paid from July 21, 1973 to October 19, 1973.
The grievant successfully bid for a DC-9 Captain vacancy
and commenced training in that position on November 18, 1972.
There is no dispute over his rate of pay until March 19, 1973.
On that date the Company determined that he "failed to qualify
for promotion in equipment or status" (i.e. failed to qualify
as a DC-9 Captain) within the meaning of Section 16(B) of the
Agreement.

The Company contends that the grievant was there-

after offered, and that he accepted, a position as a DC-9 CoPilot to afford him additional experience on the aircraft preliminary to a second effort to qualify as a DC-9 Captain.

The

Company asserts that his reduction in pay to that of a DC-9 CoPilot effective March 19, 1973 was proper and consistent with
his reduced status.
The Union maintains that on March 19, 1973 the grievant
had not failed to qualify within the meaning of Section 16(B),
but rather that he had "failed to progress," and that the period of time thereafter while working primarily as a DC-9 Copilot was a continuation of his DC-9 Captain training, looking
towards later qualification as a DC-9 Captain.

Therefore the

Union argues, his pay subsequent to March 19, 1973 should have
been continued at the DC-9 Captain level.
Alternatively, the Union asserts that if the grievant was
in fact reduced to DC-9 Co-Pilot status on March 19, 1973, that
change in status constituted an "assign(ment)" under Paragraph

- 3 3 of the Letter Agreement of August 26, 1971, and an assignment as defined by Section 27(A) of the Agreement.

And that

therefore his pay from March 19, 1973 to July 21, 1973 should
have continued at the DC-9 Captain's rate.
It is undisputed that on July 21, 1973 following a second
"Line Check" the grievant failed to qualify within the meaning
of Section 16(B) of the Agreement.

Thereafter, following a

period of medical leave, he returned to a Captaincy of an
Electra (L188), the job heheld prior to his bid to the DC-9
Captain vacancy.

From July 21, 1973 to October 1973, when the

grievant flew his first revenue flight as an Electra Captain,
the Company paid him at the DC-9 Co-Pilot's rate which is less
than the pay of an Electra Captain.

The Company asserts it did

so consistent with Paragraph 1 Section f of the Letter of Agreement dated August 26, 1971.

The Union claims that the Company's

reliance thereon is misplaced and that under the Collective
Agreement the grievant was entitled to pay as an Electra Captain as of July 21, 1973, when undisputedly, he failed to qualify as a DC-9 Captain.
There is no serious quarrel with the Company's determination that as of March 19, 1973, the grievant had not acquired
the requisite proficiency of a DC-9 Captain.

Consequently I

find no fault with the Company's substantive determination that
as of that date the grievant was not qualified to pilot a DC-9
as its captain.

The question is whether the Company adequately

invoked Section 16(B) of the Agreement by clear notice to the
grievant that he had failed to qualify in accordance with that

- 4contractual provision.

I find that the Company did.

Any

equivocal statements which the DC-9 Chief Pilot may have expressed to the grievant orally concerning his status, must be
considered in conjunction with the express written statements
of the Chief Pilot in letters dated March 6 and March 29, 1973
to the grievant.

Those letters, in my judgment, make clear

what the Chief Pilot thought the grievant's status was, and I
am satisfied that those letters, together with oral statements
to the grievant, adequately and clearly notified him that he
had failed to qualify as a DC-9 Captain within the meaning of
Section 16(B) of the Agreement.
Chief Pilot Rowland's letter of March 6, 1973 not only
states that the grievant had not Breached the level of proficiency required to operate as a DC-9 Line Captain" but went on
to expressly state that "Section 16(B) of the ONA-ALPA Agreement spells out the procedure to be followed in this case ..."
Clearly, the grievant was being notified that Section 16(B)
was being invoked and that he had failed to meet the proficiency
standards within the context of that contract section.

Again

in Rowland's letter to the grievant of March 29, 1973, it is
stated in pertinent part;
1'You

have failed to qualify for promotion to
DC-9 Captain in that you did not achieve a
satisfactory grade on your pilot line check.
Section 16(B) states that you shall be given
one additional opportunity to qualify and
you must qualify on the second attempt."

I find no frailty in the Company's position by the delay
between March 19 and Rowland's letter of March 29.

During that

period the Company was properly awaiting word from the grievant

- 5 as to whether he would return to an Electra Captaincy or accept
additional experience as a DC-9 Co-Pilot.

Therefore it is man-

ifest that the Company both invoked Section 16(B) and unequivocally informed the grievant that he had failed to qualify under
that Section of the Agreement.
That the grievant in his letter of March 19, 1973 to Chief
Pilot Rowland stated that he "did not concur that this falls
under Section 16(B) of the ONA-ALPA working Agreement" is not
enough to disturb this conclusion.

I believe, based on the

grievant's testimony herein that his statement was intended to
dispute the qualitative determination which the Company made at
that time, or in other words, his quarrel with the Company was
not that Section 16(B) was not or could not be invoked, but
rather that he disagreed with the Company's decision that he
had not achieved the requisite proficiency as a DC-9 Captain.
Nor is the foregoing conclusion overturned by the Company's
treatment of Captain E. Kirschenbaum.

The Union argues that

the grievant and Kirschenbaum were factually similarly situated;
that Kirschenbaum1s failure of an FAA flight check and a subsequent line check as a DC-9 Captain was comparable (if not
more serious) than the grievant's status on March 19, 1973
(especially since the grievant had passed his FAA check;) but
that unlike the grievant the Company accorded Kirschenbaum a
second line check one month after his earlier line check failure and then qualified him as a DC-9 Captain.
In short it is the Union's claim that the grievant should
have been accorded the same additional opportunity and train-

- 6 ing as a DC-9 Captain subsequent to March 19, 1973 as was
accorded Kirschenbaum subsequent to his first line check failure, and that not to do so discriminated against the grievant.
I reject the Union's contention in this regard simply because I view the facts of the Kirschenbaum case differently,
and because the Kirschenbaum case cannot be construed as precedential .
The record discloses a significant difference between
Kirschenbaum and the grievant.

On March 19, 1973 the grievant's

proficiency and the prospect for his relatively quick acquisition of the skills required of a DC-9 Captain were seriously
questioned by the Company.

At best, the Company felt that he

might qualify as a DC-9 Captain only after a considerable number of additional hours of experience (specifically 100 additional hours experience as a DC-9 Co-pilot.)

But the Company's

judgment of Kirschenbaum's ability was different.

It deter-

mined that he was virtually at the point of qualifying when he
failed his first line check in August, 1971, and that with a
short additional period of training and experience he would
qualify as he did one month later.
There is nothing in the record before me which rebuts
these differing qualitative evaluations by the Company of these
two pilots.

And hence I am unable to conclude that the Kirschen

baum case and the instant dispute are substantively similar.
Moreover, even if the two situations were comparable, the
single Kirschenbaum case can hardly be deemed a practice to
which the Company is thereafter bound, especially in view of

- 7 the testimony and other cited cases where other pilots were
handled in the same way that the Company treated the grievant.
We turn then to what the grievant's rate of pay should
have been from March 19, 1973 to July 21, 1973 when, uncontestedly, he failed to qualify as a DC-9 Captain.

Neither the

Agreement nor the side letter of August 26, 1972, provide a
definitive answer.

Section 16(B) of the contract indicates

what the pilot's status shall be only in the events that he
does not seek the opportunity to again qualify in six months,
and if, having elected to try again within six months, he fails
that second time.

It does not cover the facts of the instant

case, where, under any theory advanced, the grievant had
either elected or had been accorded the opportunity to attempt
to qualify* within six months after March 19.

So, as to the

grievant, he neither declined the opportunity to qualify within six months, nor, between the period March 19 and July 21,
1973, had he yet failed in a second attempt.

Section 27 also

does not help in determining the grievantfs rate of pay during
the disputed period.

It merely defines an assignment as "a

position held by a pilot, not as a result of bidding procedure."
It neither tells us the circumstances under which Section 3 of
the Letter Agreement is applicable, nor does it deal at all
with the question of pay.
I am not persuaded that Section 3 of the Letter Agreement
of August 26, 1973 is applicable.

I construe that Section to

apply to the circumstance where an employee has successfully
bid for a promotion, but his bid cannot be implemented, either

- 8 for training or permanent status because of, for example the unavailability of the equipment, cancellation of routes, diminution of work, etc.. and instead he is placed in some other job.
In that event, Section 3 entitles him to the higher rate of pay
of the job into which he has successfully bid because, through
no fault of his, the Company has assigned him elsewhere, when
pursuant to the seniority and promotion provisions of the Agreement he should be working or training in the higher classification.
But those are not the facts here.

The grievant was not

assigned to the position of DC-9 Co-Pilot during any period
when he should have been working as a DC-9 Captain pursuant to
his bid.

His demotion to DC-9 Co-Pilot was not in lieu of

the period of training and experience as a DC-9 Captain to
which he was entitled.

On the contrary he was afforded a full

opportunity over the requisite period of time to train as a
DC-9 Captain at DC-9 Captain's pay in complete compliance with
his bidding rights and the contract.

It was not until he fail-

ed to qualify as a DC-9 Captain that his status changed to that
of a DC-9 Co-Pilot.

And therefore his service in the latter

capacity neither conflicted with, nor was a substitute for any
period of time during which he should have been working and paid
at the DC-9 Captain's level.

Put another way, his successful

bid had run its course from November 1972 to March 21, 1973.
Aside from the right to try again within six months he no longer was entitled to the status of the job to which he had bid.
With this change of status to a DC-9 Co-Pilot, he no longer met
either the conditions or the intent of Section 3, nor was he

- 9 any longer entitled to its protection.
Under these circumstances it is both logical and appropriate that the grievant be paid at the rate of the job in
which he was actually working -- DC-9 Co-pilot.

I find that

the Company expressly offered that position to him; that he
accepted it; and that in the absence of a contract provision
to the contrary, and I found none, he is bound to the pay
rate of that job.
On March 19, 1973 the grievant could have returned to an
Electra Captaincy.

Thereafter within six months he could have

attempted again to qualify as a DC-9 Captain.
choose to do that.

He did not

Instead, following the Company's clear

determination that he failed to qualify as a DC-9 Captain, and
after a full opportunity to so qualify pursuant to his bidding
rights, he was offered the opportunity to gain an additional
100 hours experience on the DC-9 aircraft as a Co-Pilot.

He

accepted that offer, and despite his protest over the applicability of Section 16(B) in his letter of March 19, 1973, he
did not file a grievance during the entire period of time he
served as a DC-9 Co-Pilot.

I consider this as an uncondition-

al acceptance of the Company's offer, and the consequent establishment of his status as a DC-9 Co-Pilot from March 19, 1973
to July 21, 1973.
It is well settled that an employer and an individual employee covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement may not
reach a private understanding contrary to the terms of the
•~ Collective Agreement.

But where as here, there is an absence

- 10 of express, contrary or even applicable contract language covering this circumstance, the understanding between the Company and the grievant is not only binding, but the best evidence of what was intended.
Accordingly I find that between March 19, 1973 and July
21, 1973, the grievant was in status of a DC-9 Co-Pilot and
was properly paid at the DC-9 Co-Pilot rate.
On July 21, 1973 when the grievant failed his line check
he failed to qualify for promotion to DC-9 Captain under all
the provisions of Section 16(B) of the Agreement.

Under that

circumstance Section 16(B) provides the answer to what the
grievant's rate of pay should have been from July 21, 1973.
It states:
"In the event the pilot fails to qualify in a
second attempt for such promotion, he shall remain in his highest status and available equipment in accordance with system seniority, provided that eligibility for such pilot to bid
for future promotions will be at the Company's
discretion."
To my mind only one interpretation is possible, and that
is that the grievant's highest status and available equipment
in accordance with system seniority following his failure to
achieve DC-9 Captain status was as an Electra Captain.
Clearly his highest status could not have been as a DC-9
Captain because he failed to qualify for that job after his
second attempt.

Also the reference to system seniority must

mean a pilot's seniority throughout the Company's operations,
and hence obviously relates to the highest job for which the
pilot is qualified. In the instant case that was as an Electra
Captain.

- 11 For two reasons I conclude that the grievant was entitled
to the Electra Captain's rate of pay on July 21, 1973 or
immediately after failing to qualify as a DC-9 Captain. First,
Section 16(B), which accords him his highest status and available equipment based on system seniority, provides for no
time lag between the failure to qualify and that status. Also,
the proviso "that eligibility for such pilot to bid future
promotions would be at Company discretion" appears to me to
be the quid pro quo (i.e. an effective bar to future bids)
for the pilot's immediate restoration to the highest job to
which his seniority entitles him.
Secondly I reject the Company's assertion that it was
not required to restore the grievant to the Electra Captain's
pay rate until 90 days after his change in status from DC-9
Co-Pilot to Electra Captain, or until he flew his first revenue trip as an Electra Captain, whichever occurred first.
(Here the grievant flew his first revenue trip on October 19,
1973.)

I am not persuaded by that position simply because

the Company relies on Section 1 f of the Letter Agreement of
August 26, 1971, and I do not find the Letter Agreement applicable.

By its very terms the Letter Agreement in its entirety

was negotiated to clarify the pay a pilot shall receive when
he has been given an award to equipment or status different
than that which he currently holds. (Emphasis added.) Though
the grievant initially received an award from the Electra
Captaincy to the promotional opportunity of DC-9 Captain, I
hardly think that following his failure to qualify as a DC-9
Captain, his return to an Electra Captaincy can reasonably be

- 12 construed as an "award" within the meaning and purpose of the
entire Letter of Agreement.
Accordinly from July 21, 1973 to October 19, 1973 the
Company violated the contract when it paid the grievant at the
DC-9 Co-Pilot's rate.

During that period he should have been

paid as an Electra Captain.

The Company shall make him whole

for the difference.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Unity Lodge Local 405 UAW

'

and

'
i

Pratt & Whitney Small Tool
Division of Colt Industries
Operating Corp.

Award

'
'
'

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in accordande with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the abovenamed parties, and dated October 5, 1975 and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the parties, Awards, as follows:
Pursuant to the Supplemental Agreement, Peter
Bleeker shall be paid average earnings on the
job of Thread Miller level 11 retroactive to on
or about January 2, 1973 when he returned to
work.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: January 14, 1974
STATE OF New York )
/ qq •
COUNTY OF New York) " '
On this 14th day of January, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

Case No. 12 30 0072 73

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

Unity Lodge Local 405 UAW

'

and
Pratt & Whitney Small Tool
Division of Colt Industries
Operating Corp.

Opinion
'
'
'

The stipulated issue is
What shall be the disposition of the Union's demand for arbitration to the American Arbitration
Association dated April 20, 1973?
The Union's demand for arbitration reads:
NATURE OF DISPUTE: Company is in violation of the
contract of October 5, 1970, letter of Agreement
of October 21, 1970 and Special Agreement of April
5, 1972 with respect of Peter Bleeker, 9-1160, as
set forth in Grievance CT-73-1, for the following
reasons: Since he was on lay-off with recall
rights, Employee Bleeker was entitled when he returned to work on or about January 2, 1973 to payment of his average earnings as specified in said
Special Agreement.
REMEDY SOUGHT: Payment of said average earnings
henceforth with retroactive wage adjustment from
January 2, 1973.
A hearing was held at the Company offices in West Hartford,
Connecticut on August 21, 1973.

The Arbitrator's oath was

waived and the parties filed post hearing briefs.
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The collective bargaining relationship between
the parties was basically defined, at all times relevant
to this dispute, by an agreement ("the basic contract")
entered into by the parties on October 5, 1970, and to continue in effect until January 7, 1974.

Pursuant to a request

of the employer, the parties entered into discussions subsequent to October 5, 1970, as a result of which a Special
Agreement ("the supplemental agreement") affecting the
employer's compensation plan was entered into by the parties
on April 5, 1972, effective May 1, 1972.
The portion of .the basic contract relevant to
the instant dispute, Article VII, Seniority, reads, in
pertinent part, as follows:
"Article VII, SECTION 1, (c) In all cases
of increase or decrease of the working
force seniority by occupations within de' partrnents shall be observed, but at. such
times the Company shall not be required,
on the basis of an employee's seniority,
to assign such employee, to a work classification or occupation in a higher job
level,, except as provided under Section 10
of this article,
"When employees are so laid off or recalled
in any occupation within a department they
shall be laid off or recalled according to
the following procedure, except as it is
hereinafter modified:

-• .

"The employee with the least seniority shall
be the first laid off; the employee with
the next to the least seniority shall be
the second laid off, and so on, the employee
in each occupation in each department with
the greatest uninterrupted seniority with
the Company being the last laid off in each
occupation in each department."
"In recalling employees to work after layoff
they shall be recalled in each occupation in
each department in reverse of the order in
which they were laid off.
* * *

"SECTION 5. An employee transferred
front one occupation to another will
retain his seniority in his former
occupation for a period of one year
when his accumulated seniority will
be transferred to the occupation in
which he is presently employed."

"SECTION 6. Seniority for the purposes
of this article shall be deemed to
date from the date of original hiring
by the Company of each employee and
shall be considered to have been interrupted only by reason of:
* * *
(c) Being hereafter laid off for lack
of work for a period of more than one
year and at such time has , in accordance with the terms of this agreement,
up to five years' seniority; being
hereafter laid off for lack of work for
a period of more than two years and at
such time has, in accordance with the
terms of this agreement, seniority up
to ten years; being hereafter "laid off
for lack of work for a period ' of three
years or more and at such time has, in
accordance with the terms of this -agreement, ten years or more seniority."

* * *
"SECT-ION 10. (a) Should any employee
about to be laid off in one occupation
be able, on the basis of previous
satisfactory performance in the Companies,
of performing satisfactorily the work
being done by another employee of less
seniority (whether or not in the same
occupation or department but within the
Company) , the Company will, at the
employee's request, transfer such senior
employee to such other job, provided,
however , that the senior employee so
transferred shall replace the employee
who would be next laid off in the occupation in the department to which such
senior employee is so transferred and the
employee so displaced shall then be subject
to layoff.

"(b) while any employee is on layoff
from the Company, in addition to
his other rights in this article,
he shall have recall rights to
either or both of the following job
openings, should they become available, before less senior employees:
(i) Any lower level job in the
occupation from which he is on
layoff;
(ii) Any one job in which he
has been formally classified,, has
deraonstrated his ability to do the
work, and which he has selected
by written notice to the Personnel
Department at time of layoff; provided that his recall opportunity
will be limited in either category
to the first opening to which his
seniority entitles-him and, provided
further, that the election of recall
to either opportunity exhausts his
rights under this subsection,"

* * *
"SECTION 14. When an opening exists
within the bargaining unit to which
no employee has claim by virtue of
prior sections of this Article VII,
the Company Personnel Department
will post such opening on the shop
bul.letin boards for not less than
five (5)'working days.
"Employees to whom such openings are
an opportunity for promotion or
advancement, and who are interested,
may make application during this fiveday period, in writing, to the Personnel Department on forms supplied by it.
Those who make such application shall
be advised of the outcome by the
Personnel Department.

"The Company will fill such vacancies from among those applicants
who have the ability to do the
work required, if any such apply,
on the basis of seniority first
within the department, then within
the Company. (Ability to perform
the work required shall be construed to mean that the employee
has the ability and skills to
meet the job requirements when
assigned to them.)
"A successful applicant under this
procedure shall not be eligible
to apply for another opening hereunder for a period of six (6)
months from the date of his new
assignment. "

"SECTION 15, Production Machinists
will be utilized to break bottlenecks, reduce overtime and to meet
production requirements in any particular work center or department.
They will not be assigned to a particular work center or department
to the fextent that it would cause
the layoff or prevent the normal
recall of a more senior employee.
"The application of -Production Machinists 'in the Pratt & Whitney Cutting
Tool & Gage Division will continue
in accordance with past practice in
that Company. "
*

* *
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The supplemental agreement reads as follows:
"In accordance with the Contract, Letter of
Agreement dated October 21, 1970, the Pratt
& Whitney Small Tool Division and the Union
Local 405 have held discussions relative to
the compensation plan in Said Division. As
a result of these discussions a proposal for
a trial elimination of the present incentive
system in Small Tool Division was agreed upon.
"The details of this proposal are as follows:
1 a. Employees who have 100% or over on
' either the' April-May 1971 average
efficiency listing or the NovemberDecember 1971 listing will be paid
at the higher of the two efficiency
ratings for the life of this Agreement.
Employees v?ho have 90% or over on
either the April-May 1971 efficiency
listing or the November-December 1971
listing will be paid at the higher of
the two efficiency ratings until
July 31, 1972.
Employees who are under 90% on both
of the aforementioned listings will
be brought UD to 90% until July 31,
1972.
b. Employees who have an average efficiency of 95% or over but do not
have 100% on the aforementioned
'listings will be b'rought up to 100%
on July 31, 1972.
Employees who on July 31, 1972 are
under 95% will be brought up to 95%
until January 1, 1973.
c. Employees who on January 1, 1973 are
under 100% will be brought up to
100% for the duration of this Agreement.
d. Any employee who name does not appear on
the April-May 1971 or the NovemberDecember 1971 average efficiency listings
and who is not specifically covered
elsewhere in this Agreement will be paid
at the April-May 1970 average
or earlier if necessarv.

"2.

Employees who have recall rights either
from lay-off or within the Company during the life of this Agreement and. who
exercise said recall rights shall receive maximum benefits under la, b, c
and d herein above.

!I3.

Employees who are promoted either in
their own occupation or to another
occupation will carry the average in
effect at the time of this promotion,
payable at the higher level.
One employee in Cut-off, P. Deschense,
five employees in Precision Tools,
F. Marques, N. Jiminez, D. Rabb, M.
Santos and N. Bedard will be put on
bonus rates and compensated the same
as those employees whose average is
under 90%. If we return to the present
incentive system these employees will
revert back to their pay status prior
to this Agreement.
All wage increases as set forth in the
Contract of October 5, 1970 shall be
paid to all employees covered by this
Agreement and shall be included in
averaging their wages on and after the
applicable dates.

"4.

"5.

"6.

Seniority regarding jobs and assignments will remain the same as in the
past.
"7. No employee will come into the bargaining unit from a non-bargaining unit position during this trial period without
approval of the Union.
"8f It is understood and agreed by the parties
that this Agreement affects only the Small
Tool and Gage Divisions for the duration
of the trial period (May 1, 1972-January 7,
1973) and in no way affects or changes the
systems within the Machine Tool Division
and/or Chandler Evans Inc in accordance
with the Contract dated October 5, 1970.
"The effective date of this Agreement is May 1,
1972 and sai.d Agreement will continue in effect
until January 7, 1973 unless cancelled by either
party on or after July 31, 1972 upon 60-days
notice of such intention. Continuation of this
Agreement will require mutual consent by both
parties. In the event, the Agreement is cancelled
by either party the Company will revert back to
the present incentive system as soon as possible
uut not later tnan March 31, 1973.
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The grievarit was first employed by the company
in January 1957.

He served continuously thereafter pro-

gressing steadily through various occupations and job
levels, the high point of his employment being his service
as a Production Machinist from June 1963 to April 1969,
during which period he reached job level 12 in a system
in which 14 was the highest job level.
Because of decreases in the amount of available
work, grievant was assigned and classified as a Cylindrical
Grinder at job level 9 in April 1969; continuing decreases
forced his layoff in April 1972 while still in the latter
occupation.

He returned to work in .the occupation of Thread

Miller, job level 11 in January 1973, and has continued in
that occupation to date.
The title Production Machinist is, in reality, a
category created to enable management to fill in at any point
in the shop where additional skilled manpower is needed to
prevent a bottleneck or o'ther interruption of the steady flow
of production.

The need for and the uses of this category

would naturally tend to shift and change in response to
various circumstances such as the quantity .of work in hand,
the general state of the work force, etc.

Thus, a Production

Machinist might find himself during one period doing different types of work every few days and in other circumstances

- 9 might be assigned to a single occupation for extended periods
of time.

In order to protect incumbents in the various occupa-

tions in which Production Machinists might serve in their
"trouble-shooting" capacity, the Union had demanded and obtained agreement that Production Machinists earn neither formal classification nor seriority in any of the occupations
whose work they perform as Production Machinists and that all
seniority earned in the latter category is attributed to their
last formal classification prior to Production Machinist. Thus,
according to the Union witness who provided all of the testimony on the nature and status of the Production Machinist,
an employee in that category at time of lay-off would have no
right of recall to the occupation of Production Machinist;
but rather with certain additional but irrelevant features,
his recall rights relate to the last occupation to which he
had been formally classified.

The right to recall is de-

fined in Article VII, Section 10 (b) of the basic contract
and entitles the laid-off employee to recall to:
"(i ) any lower level job in the occupation
from which he is laid off;
"(ii) any job in which he has been formally
classified, has demonstrated his ability to do the work and which he has
selected by written notice to the Personnel Department at time of layoff..."

- 10 Section 1 of the Supplemental Agreement defines the various dates and range of incentive efficiency ratings which
would apply to such employees.

Sections 2 and 3 of the agree-

ment prescribes the conditions for application of the agreement's provisions to employees recalled from layoff (Section 2),
and to employees promoted within their own or to other occupations (Section 3).

Those sections read as follows;

"2.

Employees who have recall, rights either from
layoff or within the Company during the life
of this Agreement and who exercise such recall rights shall receive maximum benefits
under la, b, c and d herein above.

"3.

Employees who are promoted either in their
own occupation or to another occupation will
carry the average in effect at the time of
this promotion, payable at the higher level.11

In the instant case, as I see it, the issue is whether the
grievant was recalled within the meaning of either of the applicable foregoing provisions of the Basic Agreement or Supplemental
Agreement, or whether he was promoted so as to be entitled to incentive pay as provided by Section 3 of the Supplemental Agreement .
I am satisfied that the grievant was not recalled from layoff within the meaning of the applicable provisions of the Basic
or Supplemental Agreements. He did not return to "any lower
level job in the occupation from which he was laid off;"

he

- 11 was not returned to employment as a Cylinderical Grinder,
his last occupation prior to layoff; nor was he re-employed
in "any job in which he has been formally classified ...and
which he has selected by written notice to the Personnel
Department at the time of layoff ..."

To accept the Union's

assertion that the grievant was recalled within the meaning
of the Basic and Supplemental Agreements would require findings which would expand the seniority rights of employees in
the Production Machinist category, and would be inconsistent
with the Union's long standing position in that regard.

For

to hold, as the Union argues, that the grievant's performance of Thread Miller work during his tenure as a Production
Machinist entitled him to recall as a Thread Miller would be
to hold that he had prior tenure as a Thread Miller.

This

would be entirely inconsistent with the Union's clearly established position that service as a Production Machinist in
any occupation does not constitute classification in that
occupation, involves no tenure in that occupation, and therefore cannot result in acquisition of any seniority in that
classification.
However, I see no such impediment to identifying the
grievant's return to work as what I am persuaded it in fact

- 12 was - a negotiated promotion from layoff. And in that circumstance I am satisfied that both equitably and contractually,
the grievant is entitled to average earnings as provided in
Section 3 of the Supplemental Agreement.
I recognize that the grievant had no unilateral right
while on layoff, to demand the job to which he was assigned
upon his re-employment.

Additionally there is no question

that he did not bid on that job nor was he assigned to it by
the Company pursuant to the bidding procedures of the contract,
In other words, he did not have a unilateral right which on
his own initiative he could have exercised under the contract
to obtain the job of Thread Miller level 11.

But this does

not mean that the Company could not extend and expand his promotional rights by actions which constituted an offer of promotion, provided the Union did not object.
precisely what happened in the instant case.

I believe that is
The Company

reached out to the grievant while he was on layoff, asked him
if he would return to work as a Thread Miller, and then negotiated with him the grade level as a condition of his return.
The bilateral discussions between the Company and the grievant resulted in an agreement that he would return to work at
level 11, a higher job level than the level 9 Cylindrical

- 13 Grinder job he held when laid off.

In short the Company was

not required to give him the Thread Miller job, level 11, but
having initiated the effort to restore him to active employment, and having negotiated and agreed with him on a job
higher than that which he occupied at the time of layoff, and
there being no objection from the Union, I am constrained to
conclude that a promotion was indeed effectuated.

And under

that circumstance, together with the fact that as part of the
negotiations with the Company and as a condition of his return to work the grievant reserved his right to grieve for
average pay, I see no reason why both logically and contractually he does not fall squarely within the provisions of
Section 3 of the Supplemental Agreement.
Accordingly the grievant shall be paid average earnings
as specified in the Supplemental Agreement, retroactive to
on or about January 2, 1973, the date he returned to work.

Erip-7 J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the matter of the Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge Local 405 UAW
and

.

Pratt & Whitney Small Tool
Division of Colt Industries
Operating Corp.

'
i
'
i
'
'
'

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in accordande with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the abovenamed parties, and dated October 5, 1975 and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the parties, Awards, as follows:
Pursuant to the Supplemental Agreement, Peter
Bleeker shall be paid average earnings on the
job of Thread Miller level 11 retroactive to on
or about January 2, 1973 when he returned to
work.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: January 14, 1974
STATE OF New York )
/CO
•
COUNTY OF New York) '"
On this 14th day of January, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known 'and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

Case No. 12 30 0072 73

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Unity Lodge Local 405 UAW
and
Pratt & Whitney Small Tool
Division of Colt Industries
Operating Corp.

'
'
i
'
'
i
'
'
'

Opinion

The stipulated issue is
What shall be the disposition of the Union's demand for arbitration to the American Arbitration
Association dated April 20, 1973?
The Union's demand for arbitration reads:
NATURE OF DISPUTE: Company is in violation of the
contract of October 5, 1970, letter of Agreement
of October 21, 1970 and Special Agreement of April
5, 1972 with respect of Peter Bleeker, 9-1160, as
set forth in Grievance CT-73-1, for the following
reasons: Since he was on lay-off with recall
rights, Employee Bleeker was entitled when he returned to work on or about January 2, 1973 to payment of his average earnings as specified in said
Special Agreement.
REMEDY SOUGHT: Payment of said average earnings
henceforth with retroactive wage adjustment from
January 2, 1973.
A hearing was held at the Company offices in West Hartford,
Connecticut on August 21, 1973.

The Arbitrator's oath was

waived and the parties filed post hearing briefs.

The collective bargaining relationship between
the parties was basically defined, at all times relevant
to this dispute, by an agreement ("the basic contract")
entered into by the parties on October 5, 1970, and to continue in effect until January 7, 1974.

Pursuant to a regues-

of the employer, the parties entered into discussions subsequent to October 5, 1970, as a result of which a Special
Agreement ("the supplemental agreement") affecting the
employer's compensation plan was entered into by the parties
on April 5, 1972. effective Hay 1, 1972.
The portion of .the basic contract relevant to
the instant dispute, Article VII, 'Seniority, reads, in
pertinent part, as follows:
"Article VII, SECTION 1, (c) In all cases
of increase or decrease of the working
force seniority by occupations within de' partrnents shall be observed, but at such
•times the Company shall not be required,
on the basis of an employee's seniority,
to assign such employee to a work classification or occupation in a higher job
level,, except as provided under Section 10
of this article.
"When employees are so laid off or recalled
in any occupation within a department they
shall be laid off or recalled according to
the following procedure, except as it is
hereinafter modified:

• .

"The employee with the least seniority shall
be the first laid off; the employee with
the next'to the least seniority shall be
the second laid off, and so on, the employee
in eacii occupation in each department with
the greatest uninterrupted seniority with
the Company being the last laid off in each
occupation in each department."
"In recalling employees to work after layoff
they shall be recalled in each occupation in
each department in reverse of the order in
which tliev were laid off.

"SECTION 5, An employee transferred
from one occupation to another will
retain his seniority in his former
occupation for a period of one year
when his accumulated seniority will
be transferred to the occupation in
which he is presently employed."

* * *
"SECTION 6. Seniority for the purposes
of this, article shall be deemed to
date from the date of original hiring
by the Company of each employee and
shall be considered to have been interrupted only by reason of:
* * *
(c) Being hereafter laid off for lack
of work for a period of more than one
year and at such time has, in accordance with the terms of this agreement,
up to five years' seniority; being
hereafter laid off for lack of work for
a period of more than two years and at
such time has, in accordance with the
terms of this agreement, seniority up
to ten years; being hereafter "laid off
for lack of work for a period of three
years or more and at such time has, in
accordance with the terms of this-agreement, ten years or more seniority."

"SECTION 10. (a) Should any employee
about to be laid off in one occupation
be able, on the basis of previous
satisfactory performance in the Companies,
of performing satisfactorily the work
being done by another employee of less
seniority (whether or not in the same
occupation or department but within the
Company), the Company will, at the
' employee's request, transfer such senior
employee to such other job, provided,
however, that the senior employee so
transferred shall replace the employee
who would be next laid off in the occupation in the department to which such
senior employee is so transferred and the
employee so displaced shall then be subject
to layoff.
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(b) While any employee is on layoff
from the Company, in addition to
his other rights in this article,
he shall have recall rights to
either or both of the following job
openings, should they become available, before less senior employees:
(i) 7my lower level job in the
occupation from which he is on
layoff;
(id) Any one job in which he
has been formally classified, has
demonstrated his ability to do the
work, and which he has selected
by written notice to the Personnel
Department at time of layoff; provided that his recall opportunity
will be limited in either category
to the first opening to which his
seniority entitles- him and, provided
further, that the election of recall
to either opportunity exhausts his
rights under this subsection."

"SECTION 14. When an opening exists
within the bargaining unit to which
no employee has claim by virtue of
prior sections of this Article VII-,
the Company Personnel Department
will post such opening on the shop
bulletin boards for not less than
five (5) 'working days.
"Employees to whom such openings are
an opportunity for promotion or
advancement, and who are interested,
may make application during this fiveday period, in writing, to the Personnel Department on forms supplied by it,
Those who make such application shall
' be advised of the outcome by the
Personnel Department.
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"The Company will fill such vacancies from among those applicants
who have the ability to cio the
work required, if any such apply,
on the basis of seniority first
within the department, then within
the Company. (Ability to perform
the work required shall be construed to mean that the employee
has the ability and skills to
meet the job requirements when
assigned to them.)
"A successful applicant under this
procedure shall not be eligible
to apply for another opening hereunder for a period of six (6)
months from the date of his new
assignment. "

"SECTION 15, Production Machinists
will be utilized to break bottlenecks, reduce overtime and to meet
production requirements in any particular work center or department.
They will not be assigned to a particular work center or department
to the extent that it would cause
the layoff or prevent the normal
recall of a more senior employee.
"The application of -Production Machinists 'in the Pratt & Whitney Cutting
Tool & Gage Division will continue
in accordance with past practice in
that Company. "

The supplemental agreement reads as follows:
"In accordance with the Contract, Letter of
Agreement dated October 21, 1970, the Pratt
& Whitney Snail Tool Division and the Union
Local 405 have held discussions relative to
the compensation plan in Said Division. As
a result of these discussions a proposal for
a trial elimination of the present incentive
system in Small Tool Division was agreed upon.
"The details of this proposal are as follows:
1 a.

Employees who have 100% or over on
either the' April-May 1971 average
efficiency listing or the NovemberDecember 1971 listing will be paid
at the higher of the two efficiency
ratings for the life of this Agreement.
Emplo37ees V7ho have 90% or over on
• either the April-May 1971 efficiency
listing or the November-December 1971
listing will be paid at the higher of
the two efficiency ratings until
July 31, 1972.
Employees who are under 90S on both
of the aforementioned listings will
be brought up to 90% until July 31,
1972.

b. Employees who have an average efficiency of 95% or over but do not
have 100% on the aforementioned
'listings will be b'rought up to 100%
on July 31, 1972.
Employees- who on July 31, 1972 are
under 95% will be brought up to 95%
until January 1, 1973.
c. Employees who on January 1, 1973 are
under 100% will be brought up to
100% for the duration of this Agreement.
d. Any employee who name does not appear on
the April-May 1971 or the HovemberDecember 1971 average efficiency listings
and who is not specifically covered
elsewhere in this Agreement will be paid
at the April-May 1970 average efficiency

"2.

Employees who have recall rights either
from lay-off or within the Company during the life of this Agreement and who
exercise said recall rights shall receive maximum benefits under la, b, c
and d herein above.

"3.

Employees who are promoted either i.n
their own occupation or to another
occupation will carry the average in
effect at the time of this promotion,
payable - at the higher level.
One employee in Cut-off, P. Deschense,
five employees in Precision Tools,
F. Marques, 1-1. Jiminez, D. Rabb, M.
Santos and N. Bedard will be put on
bonus rates and compensated the same
as those employees whose average is
under 90%. If we return to the present
incentive system these employees will
revert back to their pay status prior
to this Agreement.

"4.

"5.

• "6.

"7.

"8f

All v/age increases as set forth in the
Contract of October 5, 1970 shall be
paid to all employees covered by this
Agreement and shall be included in
averaging their wages on and after the
applicable dates.
Seniority regarding jobs and assignments will remain the same as in the
past.
No employee will come into the bargaining unit from a non-bargaining unit position during this trial period without
approval of the Union.
It is understood and agreed by the parties
that this Agreement affects only the Small
Tool and Gage Divisions for the duration
of the trial period (May 1, 1972-January 7,
1973) and in no way affects or'changes the
systems within the Machine Tool Division
and/or Chandler Evans Inc in accordance
with the Contract dated October 5, 1970.

"The effective date of this Agreement is May 1,
1972 and said Agreement will continue in effect
until January 7, 1973 unless cancelled by either
party on or after July 31, 1972 upon 60-days
notice of such intention. Continuation of this
Agreement will require mutual consent by both
parties. In the event the /agreement is cancelled
by either party the Company will revert back to
the present incentive system as soon as possible
Jjut not later tnan March 31, 1973.
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The grievant was first employed by the company
in January 1957.

He served continuously thereafter pro-

gressing steadily through various occupations and job
levels, the high point of his employment being his service
as a Production Machinist from June 1963 to April 1969,
during which period he reached job level 12 in a system
in which 14 was the highest job level.
Because of decreases in the amount of available
work, grievant was assigned and classified as a Cylindrical
Grinder at job level 9 in April 1969; continuing decreases
forced his layoff in April 1972 while still in the latter
occupation.

He returned to work in the occupation of Thread

Miller, job level 11 in January 1973, and has continued in
that occupation to date.
The title Production Machinist is, in reality, a
category created to enable management to fill in at any point
in the shop where additional skilled manpower is needed to
prevent a bottleneck or o'ther interruption of the steady flow
of production.

The need for and the uses of this category

would naturally tend to shift and change in response to
various circumstances such as the quantity .of work in hand,
the general state of the work force, etc.

Thus, a Production

Machinist might find himself during one period doing different typ'es of work every few days and in other circumstances

_ 9 might be assigned to a single occupation for extended periods
of time.

In order to protect incumbents in the various occupa-

tions in which Production Machinists might serve in their
"trouble-shooting" capacity, the Union had demanded and obtained agreement that Production Machinists earn neither formal classification nor seriority in any of the occupations
whose work they perform as Production Machinists and that all
seniority earned in the latter category is attributed to their
last formal classification prior to Production Machinist. Thus,
according to the Union witness who provided all of the testimony on the nature and status of the Production Machinist,
an employee in that category at time of lay-off would have no
right of recall to the occupation of Production Machinist;
but rather with certain additional but irrelevant features,
his recall rights relate to the last occupation to which he
had been formally•classified.

The right to recall is de-

fined in Article VII, Section 10 (b) of the basic contract
and entitles the laid-off employee to recall to:
"(i ) any lower level job in the occupation
from which he is laid off;
"(ii) any job in which he has been formally
classified, has demonstrated his ability to do the work and which he has
selected by written notice to the Personnel Department at time of.layoff..."

- 10 Section 1 of the Supplemental Agreement defines the various dates and range of incentive efficiency ratings which
would apply to such employees.

Sections 2 and 3 of the agree-

ment prescribes the conditions for application of the agreement's provisions to employees recalled from layoff (Section 2),
and to employees promoted within their own or to other occupations (Section 3).

Those sections read as follows:

"2.

Employees who have recall rights either from
layoff or within the Company during the life
of this Agreement and who exercise such recall rights shall receive maximum benefits
under la, b, c and d herein above.

"3.

Employees who are promoted either in their
own occupation or to another occupation will
carry the average in effect at the time of
this promotion, payable at the higher level."

In the instant case, as I see it, the issue is whether the
grievant was recalled within the meaning of either of the applicable foregoing provisions of the Basic Agreement or Supplemental
Agreement, or whether he was promoted so as to be entitled to incentive pay as provided by Section 3 of the Supplemental Agreement .
I am satisfied that the grievant was not recalled from layoff within the meaning of the applicable provisions of the Basic
or Supplemental Agreements. He did not return to "any loxver
level job in the occupation from which he was laid off;"

he

- 11 was not returned to employment as a Cylinderical Grinder,
his last occupation prior to layoff; nor was he re-employed
in "any job in which he has been formally classified ...and
which he has selected by written notice to the personnel
Department at the time of layoff ..."

To accept the Union's

assertion that the grievant was recalled within the meaning
of the Basic and Supplemental Agreements would require findings which would expand the seniority rights of employees in
the Production Machinist category, and would be inconsistent
with the Union's long standing position in that regard.

For

to hold, as the Union argues, that the grievant's performance of Thread Miller work during his tenure as a Production
Machinist entitled him to recall as a Thread Miller would be
to hold that he had prior tenure as a Thread Miller.

This

would be entirely inconsistent with the Union's clearly established position that service as a Production Machinist in
any occupation does not constitute classification in that
occupation, involves no tenure in that occupation, and therefore cannot result in acquisition of any seniority in that
classification.
However, I see no such impediment to identifying the
grievant's return to work as what 1 am persuaded it in fact

- 12 was - a negotiated promotion from layoff. And in that circumstance I am satisfied that both equitably and contractually,
the grievant is entitled to average earnings as provided in
Section 3 of the Supplemental Agreement.
I recognize that the grievant had no unilateral right
while on layoff, to demand the job to which he was assigned
upon his re-employment.

Additionally there is no question

that he did not bid on that job nor was he assigned to it by
the Company pursxiant to the bidding procedures of the contract,
In other words, he did not have a unilateral right which on
his own initiative he could have exercised under the contract
to obtain the job of Thread Miller level 11.

But this doe:

not mean that the Company could not extend and expand his promotional rights by actions which constituted an offer of promotion, provided the Union did not object.
precisely what happened in the instant case.

I believe that is
The Company

reached out to the grievant while he was on layoff, asked him
if he would return to work as a Thread Miller, and then negotiated with him the grade level as a condition of his return.
The bilateral discussions between the Company and the grievant resulted in an agreement that he would return to work at
level 11, a higher job level than the level 9 Cylindrical

n
- 1ij
-

Grinder job he held when laid off.

In short the Company was

riot required Lo g^ve him the Thread Miller job, level 11, but
. • •'•-.-.• •/'.I'fg' •liiIelaLeu Llie effort to restore him

to active employ-

-,--.•• .rr.ivr-t,,. ,ajid .having negotiated and agreed with him on a job
.-.-"

blgh:cTv-t;M-a't _ that which he occupied at the time of layoff, and
• '- there fee ing.no subjection from the Union, I am constrained to

j. •./.•-,• .-Cf>r>.C:Va-r!s-that :a..promotion was

indeed effectuated.

And

under

- cb:i:i: /;,ir.;:-atastance, together with the fact that as part of the
• ;?

^Pg*ot.i-a,tions with the Company and as a condition of his

.- .:- :±iarn tc s-rork tbe .grievant reserve'd his

right to grieve

refor

.•.-,.-. -^a-i'Brage.-ppy,5 I see ao reason why both logically and contract'••aaily he does, not tall squarely within the provisions of
Section 3.of the Supplemental Agreement.
..

,
:

Accordingly the grievant shall be paid average earnings
- ,7-?> .-.speictlried in'the Supplemental Agreement, retroactive to

-. ,-,-.- v.Dr,-.. or, abcait'-Jamiary
^ 2, 1973, the date he returned to work.

Eric"' J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

12
Kis return to v;ork was thus not a recall as of right under
Article VII, SECTION 10, (b) (i and ii) of the basic
It
contract. -B&& was therefore not a return to work in the
exercise of recall rights which, under Section 2 of the
supplemental agreement, would entitle an employee returning
from layoff to the benefits of SECTION 1 of the agreement.
<V*

j Among these are "provisions for posting of job *
openings, bidding by employees, designation by management
of employees from among those bidding, standards to be
applied and procedures to be followed by management in
making such designations, etc.

The management right to make

promotions as it sees fit and on a unilateral basis has
thus been limited or reduced to the extent set forth in Article VII, SECTION 14, of the basic contract.

Once all of

the provisions and conditions of Article VII, SECTION 14,
have been complied with, the employer is free to fill the
job opening as it sees fit, whether by transfer, promotion
or by hiring a new employee.

There is nothing in Article VII

or in any other article of the contract which prohibits
management from appointing an employee on lay-off status to
an occupation other than that in which he was engaged at
time of layoff; nor is there any provision which states that
such appointment shall not constitute a transfer or, if to a
job level higher than the job level at layoff, a promotion.

13
There is a continuing relationship between the
employer and the employee on layoff with seniority.

Upon

return to work, whether by recall to his former occupation
or by assignment to a new one, the employee retains his
seniority.

If the return to work is to a new assignment,

seniority is allocated, after one year, to the new occupation just as in the case of an employee on the job who is
transferred or promoted.

Based upon all of these consi-

derations, I find that when management exercises its prerogative to assign an employee on layoff with seniority
rather than hiring a new employee to fill a job opening

•>

after the requirements of Article VII, SECTION 14, have
been satisfied, the assignment constitutes a transfer or,
if to a job level higher than the job level occupied by the
employee prior to layoff, a promotion.

This finding does

not imply that an employee on layoff with seniority has any
right under the contract to transfer or promotion comparable
to his right of recall.

No such question is presented here.

In the instant case, management took the initial action,
after satisfying the requirements of Article VII, SECTION 14,
of approaching grievant and inquiring whether he would be
interested in being appointed to the Thread Miller occupation
at job level 10.

Even this appointment would have constituted

a promotion from his prior occupation as Cylindrical Grinder

14
at job level 9.,

But after discussion it was agreed that the

appointment would be at job level 11.

The mere fact that

the appointment was not made pursuant to any specific provision of the contract does not mean it was not a promotion.
Even an appointment to a new and higher occupation and job
level, mad.e in violation of a term of the contract, is a
promotion albeit an illegal promotion.

An appointment,

such as the appointment of grievant, to a new and higher
occupation, which is not made pursuant to any provision
of the contract but which does not violate any term of the
contract is a promotion, a legal promotion and a promotion
as contemplated by Section 3 of the supplemental agreement.
I find that grievant's return to work was not
an exercise of his right of recall as contemplated by
Section 2 of the supplemental agreement and consequently
did not entitle him, pursuant to said Section 2, to benefits under Section 1 of the supplemental agreement.

I find,

further, that grievant's -return to work was a promotion as
contemplated by Section 3 of the supplemental agreement
and that pursuant to said Section 3 he is entitled to the
benefits provided for in Section 1 of the supplemental agreement.

My award will accord with the foregoing findings.

15

The Company violated the contract
of October 5, 1970, the Letter of Agreement
of October 21, 1970, and the Special Agreement of April 5, 1972, by its failure and
refusal to afford to Peter Bleeker, upon
his return to work on January 2, 1973, following lay-off with recall rights, payment of
his average earnings as specified in Section 1
of said Special Agreement.

The grievance is

accordingly upheld and the Company is directed
to pay to said Employee his average earning;-;
as specified in Section 1 of said Special Agreement as from his return to work on January 2, 1973,

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Co. Workers' Association

Award
of
Arbitrators

and
Public Service Electric & Gas Company

The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Award, as follows;
Union Grievance U-104 dated December 21, 1972 is
denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

G. H. Barnstorf
Concurring

Charles W. Cornforth
Concurring

Benjamin W. Pereario
Dissenting

Daniel McNeice
Dissenting

'

DATED: June
1974
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)

":

On this
day of June, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

DATED: June
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1974

On this
day of June, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared G. H. Barnstorf to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

DATED: June
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1974

On this
day of June, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Charles W. Cornforth to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

DATED: June
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1974

On this
day of June, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Benjamin W. Perfiario to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

DATED: June
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1974

On this
day of June, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Daniel McNeice to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same
Case No. 1830 0346 73 D

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Co. Workers' Association

'
'
i
'
1

and
Public Service Electric & Gas Company

'
'
'

Opinion
of
Chairman

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between Public Service Electric
& Gas Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and
Utility Co. Workers' Association, hereinafter referred to as
the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Chairman of
a five man Board of Arbitration to hear and decide, together
with the Union and Company designees to said Board, the following stipulated issue:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance U-104 dated December 21, 1972?
Messrs. Benjamin W. Percario and Daniel McNeice served as
the Union Arbitrators on the Board of Arbitration and Messrs.
G. H. Barnstorf and Charles W. Cornforth served as the Company
Arbitrators on the Board of Arbitration.
Hearings were held in Newark, New Jersey on January 30
and March 4, 1974 at which time representatives of the Union
and Company, hereinafter referred to collectively as the
"parties," appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses,
The parties expressly waived the oath of the Arbitrators.

The

Board of Arbitration met in executive session in Newark, New
Jersey on June 3, 1974 following which the hearings were de-

clared closed.

- 2 The Union's grievance U-104 reads:
U-104 - BERGEN DISTRIBUTION DIVISION
SUPERVISORS DOING BARGAINING UNIT WORK.
The grievance arose over the fact that Mr. Zengel
and Mr. Alvarez are doing Bargaining Unit Work.
Since the retirement of Mr. Gage a "Senior Engineering Plant Assistant" we have lost a promotional
opportunity, because of the work done by Mr. Zengel
and Mr. Alvarez.
As an Award the Union seeks the Posting for a
Senior Engineering Plant Assistant.
During the course of the hearing the Union expanded the
remedy it seeks to include a claim for retroactive back pay.
Certain facts are not in dispute.

When Mr. Gage, a bar-

gaining unit employee retired from his job as Senior Engineering Plant Assistant, his job was filled by the lateral transfer
of a Mr. Rymaniak, also a bargaining unit Senior Engineering
Plant Assistant.

What is disputed initially is what if anything

was done with the work which Rymaniak performed prior to his
transfer to the Gage vacancy.

It is the contention of the Union

that Rymaniak1s assignments were assumed by Zengel and Alvarez,
both supervisory and non-bargaining

unit employees.

And that

this violated Personnel Instruction No. 27.
The Company disputes the Union's contention that Rymaniak's
work was picked up by Zengel and Alvarez.

It explains that be-

cause of a sharp diminution in available work for Senior Engineering Plant Assistants there was little if any work remaining
to be assumed by anyone following Rymaniak's transfer to the
position vacated by Gage, and what little work there was if any,
was assigned to a Mr. Vogel, a bargaining unit Senior Engineering Plant Assistant.

- 3 In any event it is the Company's contention that neither
Personnel Instruction No. 27 nor any other provision of the
contract prohibits the Company from assigning to supervisory ornon-bargaining unit personnel, work which may be or has been
performed by the bargaining unit, and that it has been a long
standing practice of the Company to make such assignments to
supervisory personnel.
The grievance fails on the threshold issue.

The Union

has not established to my satisfaction, the essential facts upon
which the grievance is based, namely that Zengel and Alvarez
assumed the work previously performed by Rymaniak.

The Union's

assertion in this regard is based solely on the testimony of
Mr. Matulewicz, its First Vice President, who investigated the
grievance, but who was not involved in performing any aspect of
the disputed work and who did not work in the particular Division involved.

His testimony, concededly, was based upon what

others told him about what happened to Rymaniak's work assignments after Rymaniak1s transfer to the Gage vacancy.
I deem the better evidence to be the testimony of Mr. Ela,
the Superintendent of the Division involved, who was responsible
for determining how many and which employees performed the work
in question and who testified not only that the quantity of
available work for Senior Engineering Plant Assistants had markedly fallen, making unnecessary the filling of the job left
open by Rymaniak1s transfer^ but that any remaining duties previously performed by Rymaniak were picked up not be Zengel and
Alvarez, but by Vogel.

- 4It is the Union's burden to establish the factual basis
upon which its grievance is based.

Weighing the conflicting

testimony of Ela and Matulewicz, I am constrained to conclude
that the Union has not met that burden especially where, as
here, Ela is more directly knowledgeable about the facts and
circumstances of this dispute.

Additionally, it is noted that

the Union did not call Vogel as a witness though he is one of
its members.

This is not to say that Zengel and Alvarez did

not pick up significant bargaining unit work left by Rymaniak
but rather that the Union has not established that fact by the
quantum of evidence necessary, and consequently has not shown,
so far as the instant record is concerned, the factual existence of the allegation upon which its grievance is based.
Accordingly we do not reach the question of whether the
assignment to supervisory employees Zengel, Alvarez or others,
of work also assigned to bargaining unit employees, is violative
of Personnel Instruction No. 27.
For the foregoing reasons the Union Grievance U-104 dated
December 21, 1972 is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Simmons Elizabeth Employees' Union
Local 420 of the Upholsterers International Union of North America
AFL-CIO
and

Award
of
Arbitrators

S imtnon s C omp any
The Undersigned Arbitrators, having been duly designated
in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named Union and Company,
and having heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
make the following Award:
The critical evidence adduced by the Company from
its principal witness was credible, unimpeached,
persuasive and therefore determinative. As a disciplinary case, the Company has met its burden of
establishing its case by the quantum and standard
of proof required in such matters. Accordingly
there was just cause for the discharge of Jesse
Knight and James Gissendaner.

Eric J. Schmertz
Cha irman

D.J. Applegate
Concurring

Walter Zlicesky
Dissenting
DATED: May 28, 1974
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
On this 28th day of May, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
day of
1974, before me personally came
and appeared D. J. Applegate to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
On this
day of
1974, before me personally came
and appeared Walter Zlicesky to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Local 365 Cemetery Workers & Green
Attendants Union

OPINION
and

- and AWARD
Springfield Island Cemetery
(Montefiore Cemetery)

The stipulated issue is:
Whether seasonal employees who worked the
two previous seasons (of at least six months
each season) are eligible for Blue Cross coverage for worker and family during the period of
non-active work between seasons? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the American Arbitration Association
on September 9, 1974 at which time representatives of the above
named Union and Employer appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.
The grievants are seasonal employees who have met the
threshold' requirement of having worked the two previous seasons
of at least six months each season.

What is in dispute is

whether they are entitled to worker and family Blue Cross coverage during the period after their active seasonal work ends and
prior to their recall to active work the next season.
The pertinent language of Section 4 Paragraph (b) reads:
seasonal employees who have worked
a period of six months in each of the two
successive years shall be entitled to receive basic individual and family Blue Cross
hospital coverage during the period of their
employment, the same to be provided by the
Employer. (Emphasis added.)

-2-

The dispute centers on the underlined
the period of their employment."

language "during

The Union contends that the

period of employment, as that phrase is construed traditionally,
includes not only the time that the seasonal employee is actively at work but also his layoff while he retains seniority and
the right to recall for the next season.

The Union acknowledges

that if such employee fails or refuses to respond to a recall
for the succeeding season he would at that point lose his
employment status and his Blue Cross coverage would then be
terminated.

The Employer asserts that the disputed phrase

covers only a seasonal employee's period of active employment
each season, and that his Blue Cross coverage may be terminated
as soon as his active work ceases.

The Employer concedes how-

ever that the affected seasonal employees (the grievants herein)
retain seniority between seasons during the layoff period, and
retain recall rights for active work in the succeeding

season

before the Employer may hire new men.
The disputed language is ambiguous.

As the Union asserts

it may be interpreted to cover any period of time during which
the employee retains "employee status."

And classically, that

includes periods of layoffs as well as active employment, so
long as an employee retains his seniority.

Contrary wise, be-

cause the language refers not to regular or full time employees
but rather to seasonal employees, it could apply with equal logic
to only that period during which the seasonal employee is

-3"employed," meaning actively at work.

It could be argued

in support of the Employer's position (though the Employer did
not do so in this case) that if the disputed phrase was intended to cover the layoff period the language would have been unnecessary and superfluous.

For without it, seasonal employees

would have continued to be covered until such time as they lost
their seniority or employee status by refusing or failing to
respond to a notice of recall.

However on the other hand, it

may be argued with equal force that the disputed and unrestricted
language was meant to make unequivocal the fact that the contract
benefit was intended to extend throughout a seasonal employees
employment relationship with the employer, namely through his
inactive as well as active "periods of employment," even though
he was only a seasonal employee.

So, a bare reading of the

contract language does not provide an interpretation dispositive
of the instant dispute.
Where contract language is ambiguous, arbitrators resort
to "past practice" for clarification.

But here past practice is

not helpful because it has not been of long duration, or consistent or uniform.

In the prior year under the disputed language,

the Employer continued Blue Cross coverage during the non-active
working time of the seasonal employees but did so with an express
reservation of his position that he was not required to do so,
and that he would not do so in this, the subsequent year.

The

practice in the rest of the Industry has been varied and inconsistent.

Some other employers have continued the coverage

-4but then discontinued it.

And it appears that this uneven

Industry-wide experience resulted both from the initiatives of
the employers separately and/or following advice to them from
their counsel.

Hence, there is not enough evidence of a

consistent and uniform practice ore way or the other to be
supportive of either the Union's or the Employer's contract
position herein.
In the absence of clarifying past practice, an arbitrator
looks to the "legislative history" of the disputed language in an
effort to glean its meaning and intent.

But the evidence as to

what happened during contract negotiations
puted language is sharply conflicting.

leading to the dis-

The Union asserts that

in the course of the negotiations and during mediation

conferences

the mediator assured the Union that his proposal meant that
seasonal workers and their families would be covered by Blue Cross
during the offseason as well as while actively at work, after
they had met the threshold

requirement of completing two

seasons of at least six months each season.
which

And that this benefit

had been previously granted by some of the cemeteries,

was to be extended to all, including this Employer.

The Union

believed or was led to believe that this proposal which in
important part ended the strike was acceptable to the cemeteries
involved, including this Employer.

Additionally the Union asserts

that following the mediated settlement, when the Employer's
counsel submitted draft contract language, he and the Union

-5President had a telephone conversation in which counsel was only
concerned with and sought assurances that Blue Cross coverage would
end when the seasonal employee refused or failed to respond to
a recall for the subsequent season but that there was no discussion
about ending it after each period of active work.

The Union

admits that when thereafter it received the final draft language
containing the disputed language it was worried that the
language might be interpretated differently than what was agreed
to.

But it explains that following discussions with its own

counsel and considering what took place in the negotiations, the
mediation and the telephone conversation, it decided that the
disputed language "would not hurt the Union's position."
The Employer's testimony is contrary.

He denies that the

mediator's proposal extended the Blue Cross coverage to the
layoff or non-active period.

He asserts that if the mediator

made any statements to the Union to that effect he made no such
similar statements to this Employer or the other cemeteries.
The Employer's counsel flatly daied the substance of his telephone
conversation with the Union's president as recited and testified
to by the latter.

He stated that throughout it was his under-

standing and intent that the Blue Cross benefit would obtain
only during the seasonal employee's period of active work and
that he so advised this Employer and other cemeteries.
In my view the foregoing sharply contradictory and divergent
testimony represents, unfortunately an evidentiary standoff, and

-6leaves the "legislative history" of the disputed language still
clouded and undetermined.

(Quite correctly, and in accordance

with the law, the mediator involved could not testify.

Resort

to his opinion would be improper and hence was not sought.)
All of this leaves one final, yet fundamental rule as the
basis for an appropriate determination of the dispute.

That

fundamental contract rule is that ambiguous and otherwise unclear
contract language, which cannot be clarified by past practice or
by evidence of what took place when it was negotiated, should
be construed against the part who wrote it.

In the instant case

it is undisputed that the phrase "during the period of their
employment," as set forth in Section 4(b), was first introduced
into the draft contract and was written in its original and
final form by counsel for the Employer.

Obviously, if he was

so clear in his own mind that the purpose and intent of that
language was to limit Blue Cross coverage to a seasonal employee's
period of active work each season (following the threshold
requirement of having worked the two previous seasons) he could
and indeed should have included the word "active" in that critical
language.

By not doing so, especially when the phrase "period

of employment" is construed traditionally in the employment
relationship to encompass any period of time during which an
employee retains his seniority, including layoffs, with a right
of recall, counsel for the Employer created the very ambiguity
with which we presently deal.

And in view of the fact that there

-7is no evidence in the record either from past practice or the
negotiations which fully or substantially support the Employer's
position and interpretation 'herein, and because there is evidence,
albeit not fully determinative, supportive of the Union's
allegations, the disputed language for which the Employer is
responsible, must be interpreted against him.
The Undersigned, having been duly designated as the
arbitrator, and having been duly sworn, and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The Union's grievance on behalf of the
seasonal employees is granted. The
affected seasonal employees who are
otherwise qualified under Section 4(b)
are entitled to Blue Cross coverage
during the off season or period of nonactive work between seasons, so long as
they retain their seniority and until
they fail or refuse to respond to a recall for active work in the subsequent
season. The Employer shall make
appropriate payments to Blue Cross to
ensure this continued coverage.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 7, 1974
STATE OF New York
)ss.COUNTY OF New York ) ''
On this 7th day of October, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
Case No.

1330-0572-74

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
Union, Local 8-575, AFL-CIO

and

Opinion

and
Tenneco, Inc.
Nuodex Division

1

t
i

Award

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties,
the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
To what vacation benefits was George Lear entitled
under Article IX of the Collective Bargaining Agreement upon his retirement on February 29, 1972?
A hearing was held in Edison, New Jersey on May 6, 1974
at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's oath was waived by the parties.

Subsequently

the parties waived the time limit for rendition of the Award.
Mr. Lear, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," retired on February 29, 1972, after approximately 35 years of
service.

The Company paid him 6 days vacation pay pursuant to

Article IX Section 4(c) of the contract.
versary date was December.

The grievant1s anni-

As an employee with more than 20

years service the grievant's full vacation entitlement each
year was 5 weeks pay.

The 6 days pay he received represented

1/12 of that vacation allowance for each month of service or
a major fraction thereof from December to the date of his re-

- 2 tirement.

That part of the instant case is undisputed.

What is in dispute is whether the grievant is entitled to
additional vacation pay, specifically 5 additional weeks for
his service during the twelve month period from December 1970
through December

1971.

Though the Union's argument varied somewhat during the
course of the arbitration hearing, its ultimate position, as I
understand it, is that the grievant earned a 5 week vacation
benefit when he completed the preceeding year of service, and
that therefore, as of his anniversary date of December 1971,
he had earned 5 weeks of vacation for the twelve months of service from December 1970.

And that upon his retirement at the

end of February, 1972, he was entitled to those 5 weeks of pay,
plus the pro rata vacation which he had accrued thereafter and
was paid.
It is the Company's contention that 6 days pay, or in
other words 1/12 of his vacation allowance for the months of
service between December 1971 and the date of his retirement is
all that the grievant is entitled to.

The Company's case is

based on an alleged practice, and on its interpretation of Section 6 of Article IX which forecloses the accumulation of vacation time and provides that vacations must be taken in the year
they are due.

Specifically the Company asserts that by practice

employees have been permitted and indeed have regularly taken
their full vacation entitlement in the very twelve month period
in which that vacation entitlement is earned or being accrued,
even if, as a consequence, an employee receives or takes a full

- 3 vacation before he fully earns it.

In the instant case the Com-

pany argues that based on this practice the 5 week vacation
which the grievant took during the period December 1970 through
December 1971 was the very vacation which he was earning and/or
accumulating by virtue of his service during that period of time,
and not, as the Union contends, an entitlement earned as a consequence of his service during the preceeding twelve month period December 1969 through December 1970.

The Company buttresses

its argument in support of this practice by interpreting Section 6 as meaning that vacations must be taken during the twelve
month period in which they are earned and/or accumulated.
As I see it the issue before me is simply whether the 5
weeks vacation which undisputedly the grievant received during
the year 1971 (the weeks of July 18, July 25, August 1, December 19 and December 26) constituted 5 weeks vacation for his
twelve months service from December 1970 through December 1971
or whether it was vacation earned as a consequence of his service from December 1969 through December 1970.
If the former, he is not entitled to vacation pay other than
the 6 days which he received when he retired on February 29, 1972,
If the latter, then the Company owes him 5 additional weeks vacation.
I interpret Section 2 of Article IX to mean that an employee
must complete specific periods of service before he becomes eligible for a vacation benefit.

It is clear that an employee is

entitled to no vacation until he has completed at least 6 months
service.

Moreover Section 2 provides that employees must pass

- 4 their anniversary dates before they receive any new or additional vacation benefit, pursuant to the schedule in Section
2(a).

So, in the case of the grievant his 5 weeks vacation

entitlement did not become a vested right until he had completed
his 20th year of service.
In other words he had not earned nor could he contractually assert a right to take 5 weeks vacation or receive 5
weeks vacation pay until he had completed the twelve months of
service which constituted the completion of his 20th year of
employment with the Company.

And thereafter in each succeeding

year, his right to 5 weeks vacation vested only following completion of each twelve month period from and to each of his
December anniversary dates.
Accordingly based on the contract the 5 weeks which the
grievant took as vacation in the year 1971 were weeks and pay
which he had earned by virtue of completing twelve months of
service previous thereto.

As I see it, the contract language,

requiring completion of service before a full vacation entitlement is earned and may be taken supports the Union's contention
in this proceeding.

Section 6 does not disturb that conclusion.

Section 6 merely provides that vacations must be taken in the
year due and may not be accumulated thereafter.

The year due,

to my mind, means the year following the completion of the period which the employee must serve in order to earn and accumulate the full vacation entitlement.
In the instant case, the full 5 week vacation which the
grievant earned by virtue of his service from December 1969

- 5 to December 1970 became due subsequent to December 1970, or
in other words, in 1971.

For the grievant to take a 5 week

vacation in 1971 which he earned as a result of his service
from December 1969 to December 1970 is fully consistent with
Section 6 and is not an "accumulation" as alleged by the Company.

I cannot accept the Company's rationale that to permit

employees to take their full vacation entitlement during the
year in which it is being earned, even at the risk of permitting them to enjoy a full vacation before they have fully
earned it, is to accord them a vacation when "due" within the
meaning of Section 6.

Rather, the Company's practice accords

them a full vacation prematurely, before it becomes due. Hence
the Company's interpretation of Section 6 cannot be relied on
as proof of the practice which it asserts has been followed
with regard to the grievant and others similarly situated.
By relying upon a practice at variance from the contract
as I have interpreted it, the burden shifts to the Company to
prove that the practice was followed in the grievant's case.
Based on the record before me the Company has not met that burden.

It merely alleged the practice but did not offer or

adduce adequate evidence or testimony to show the application
of that practice to the grievant or to other employees.

It

has not shown in this case, though it may be able to do s:o in
other pending or subsequent matters, that employees take their
vacations in full during the very twelve month period in which
those vacations are still being earned and accrued.
Accordingly I find that the grievant is entitled to 5

- 6 weeks additional vacation pay.

It should be understood however,

that that determination is confined to the particular facts and
circumstances of this case and is based in part at least on the
evidentiary frailty of the Company's reliance on an alleged
practice.

Therefore the decision in this case cannot be con-

strued as a precedent for any pending or subsequent cases.

On

the contrary, in any other pending or subsequent matter involving a similar dispute, the rights of the parties are expressly
reserved and the Company may attempt to prove the practice which
it has failed to prove in this case.

Accordingly, the Undersigned, having been designated as the
Arbitrator in the above matter and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the parties makes the following Award:
Upon his retirement on February 29, 1972, George Lear
was entitled to five weeks vacation pay in addition
to the 6 days vacation pay which he received. The
Company shall pay him the additional five weeks pay.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June
1974
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of June, 1974, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
DECISION

BARBARA A. YOUNG

and

GRIEVANCE #8583

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC
At the conclusion of the hearings in the above matter
Barbara A. Young, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant,"
and Trans World Airlines, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the
'Company," with the assistance of the Undersigned Arbitrators,
reached a settlement of the instant dispute.

That settlement

is made our Decision as follows:
1. The grievant stated that she did not wish to
return to her last position with the Company
even if the Arbitrators directed her reinstatement with full back pay.
2. Without adjudicating the merits of the respective positions of the grievant and the Company
as advanced by each at the hearings, the grievant 's discharge shall be expunged from her employment record, and changed to a voluntary
resignation. She shall be paid two weeks severance pay and her accrued vacation.
3. This is in full settlement of all claims and
contentions of the grievant and the Company
against each other as presented in the instant
proceeding.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

R. L. Mushkin

G. 0. Rodes

-2ATED: May 23, 1974
TATE OF: New York )ss:.
OUNTY OF: New York)
On this twenty third day of May, 1974, before me
ersonally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to be known and
.nown to be to be the individual described in and who executed
he foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
xecuted the same.

ATED: May
1974
TATE OF: New York )ss:.
:OUNTY OF : New York)
On this
day of May, 1974, before me personally
ame and appeared R. L. Mushkin to me known and known to me to
>e the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
.nstrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

)ATED: May
1974
STATE OF: New York ) ss -.
OUNTY OF: New York)
On this
day of May, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared G. 0. Rodes to me known and known to me to
je the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same

I In the Matter of the Arbitration

between
DECISION

• BARBARA A. YOUNG

and

GRIEVANCE #8583

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
At the conclusion of the hearings in the above matter
Barbara A. Young, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant,tf
and Trans World Airlines, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the
'Company," with the assistance of the Undersigned Arbitrators,
jreached a settlement of the instant dispute.

That settlement

s made our Decision as follows:
1. The grievant stated that she did not wish to
return to her last position with the Company
even if the Arbitrators directed her reinstatement with full back pay.
2. Without adjudicating the merits of the respective positions of the grievant and the Company
as advanced by each at the hearings, the grievant 's discharge shall be expunged from her employment record, and changed to a voluntary
resignation. She shall be paid two weeks severance pay and her accrued vacation.
3. This is in full settlement of all claims and
contentions of the grievant and the Company
against each other as presented in the instant
proceeding.

Eric y. Schp^ertz
Chairman

R. L. Mushkin

G. 0. Rodes

-2ATED: May 2r 1974
TATE OF: New York )ss:.
:OUNTY OF: New York)
On this twenty third day of- May, 1974, before me
ersonally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to be known and
:nown to be to be the individual described in and who executed
he foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
xecuted the same.
Ms!K T. Z«T"J
c
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Notary P"klic^ °81U80
r-iO. ** » '
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ATED:NMy 6 1974
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com-*

TATE OF: New York )ss..
:OUNTY OF : New York)
On this
ame and appeared
'6 the individual
instrument and he

(j?
day of-'May, 1974, before me personally
R. L. Mushkin to me known and known to me to
described in and who executed the foregoing
acknowledged to me that he executed the same

)ATED: l
1974
TATE OF: New York )ss
OUNTY OF: New York)

,
JOSEPH C. HILLY
Notary Public, S^e of New York
No 41-5902759
/
Qualified in Queens County -f I
Commission Expires March 30,19_/»^

On this
q
day of .May, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared G. 0. Rodes to me known and known to me to
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

JOSEPH 'C, HILLY
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 41-6902759
/
Qualified in Queens Count-' +~i I
Commission expires March 30, I9-f y?

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Transport of New Jersey
AWARD OF
and
ARBITRATORS
Amalgamated Transit Union

We the Undersigned Arbitrators having been duly
designated in accordance with the arbitration agreement
dated March 1, 1974 between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties make the following AWARD:
The grievance of Thomas J, Slane is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

A. Vern Kuehn
Concurring

Michael Siano
Dissenting
DATED: November 22, 1974
STATE OF: New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this
came and appeared
be the individual
instrument and he

22nd day of November, 1974, before me personally
Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
described in and who executed the foregoing
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case # 1830 0195 74 S

-2DATED:
STATE OF: New Jersey
COUNTY OF:

)ss .
)

On this
day of November, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared A. Vern Kuehn to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

DATED:
STATE OF: New Jersey
COUNTY OF:

)G O
) '

On this
day of November, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Michael Siano to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Transport Of New Jersey

OPINION OF
CHAIRMAN

and
Amalgamated Transit Union

In accordance with Section 1A of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement dated March 1, 1974 between the above
named Union and Company, the Undersigned was designated as
the Chairman of a tripartite Board of Arbitration to hear
and decide, together with the Union and Company representatives on said Board, the following stipulated issue:
What shall be the disposition of the
grievance of Thomas J. Slane?
Messrs. Michael Siano and A. Vern Kuehn served respectively as the Union and Company designees on the Board of
Arbitration.
Hearings were held in Irvington, New Jersey on September
5 and 16, 1974, at which time Mr. Slane, hereinafter referred
to as the grievant, and representatives of the Union and Company
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and to cross-examine
witnesses.
arbitrators.

The parties expressly waived the oath of the
At the conclusion of the hearing on September

16, 1974 the Board of Arbitration met in executive session.
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The grievant, and the Union on his behalf, contend
that he is a pensioner within the meaning of those provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement and the welfare plan
which entitle pensioners to certain specific benefits, namely,
a continuation of employer contributions

to Blue Cross, Blue

Shield, Major Medical and Rider J health insurance benefits,
continued coverage under the life insurance benefit and a free
transportation pass for himself and spouse.
It is stipulated by the parties that if we find the
grievant to be a pensioner within the meaning of the foregoing
sections of the contract and welfare plan, he would be entitled
to those benefits.
The Company asserts that the grievant's status is not as
a pensioner for those purposes because he was discharged for
cause.

And that he has received a pension only because under

the pension plan, recently amended to provide for vesting, his
pension was vested, and he was eligible for it irrespective of
the reason for his termination.

The Company points out that

before the pension plan was so amended employees discharged for
cause received neither a pension nor benefits which the grievant
seeks in this proceeding.

It asserts that his newly acquired

entitlement to a vested pension under the amended pension plan
did not give him as a discharged employee any additional rights
to any of the other benefits.

-3The Union contends that the grievant is a pensioner
entitled to the benefits he claims because he is receiving
a retirement pension, and because that is all that the contract
requires.

Inasmuch as the contract refers only to "pensioners"

without any other definition or limitation, the Union argues
that the grievant qualifies because he is "on pension."

And

any other reason for his termination of employment, including
arguendo, discharge for cause, are immaterial.

In the alterna-

tive the Union contends that even if the grievant was so
discharged, it is not binding herein because, as a result of
discussions between a representative of the Union and the
Company, the discharge was withdrawn in exchange for the
grievant?s retirement.

Hence the Union concludes the only status

which the grievant occupied upon leaving the Company's employ
was that of a retiree or pensioner within the meaning of the
contract and welfare plan, even as interpretated by the Company.
Based on either alternative argument the Union contends that
the grievant is eligible for the health insurance and life
insurance coverage and, the transportation pass he seeks.
I am not persuaded that a "pensioner" as referred to in
the contract and the welfare plan includes an employee who
was discharged for cause and who thereafter draws a retirement
pension because his entitlement to it was vested.

Rather I

conclude that the pensioner referred to in the contract and the

-4welfare plan, and for whom the disputed benefits continue, is
one who leaves the Company's employ for no reason other than
retirement.

In my view it would be a gross incongruity for an

employee who has been discharged for cause to continue to
enjoy certain benefits which are accorded retirees in part at
least, for faithful and satisfactory service and which therefore would not be available to an employee discharged for
cause before he became eligible for a vested pension.

As I see

it the incongruity persists just as strongly where an employee
has become eligible for a pension but is discharged for cause.
I hardly think that those contract clauses and the welfare plan
which accord to a retiree the benefits of continued employer
contributions to health insurance and life insurance plans and
a free transportation pass were intended or should be construed
to guarantee those benefits to one who draws a vested pension
but who left the Company's employ because he was discharged
for cause.

Accordingly the Union's first argument, which deems

as immaterial an unrevoked discharge, preliminary to drawing a
vested pension, cannot be sustained.
As to the Union's second argument the evidence falls
short of establishing that the grievant's discharge was either
withdrawn or transferred into a retirement.

There was a passing

discussion between a representative of the Union and the Company,
after and outside of a grievance meeting, at which the Company

-5-

representative stated that the grievant had rights to a vested
pension.

I can understand how the Union may have interpreted

this as an offer to settle the grievance over the grievant's
discharge by permitting him to retire in lieu of that discharge.
But in the face of the Company's vigorous denial of that intent,
and its explanation that its purpose was to merely inform the
Union that though the discharge remained the grievant was nonetheless entitled to draw a pension under the newly amended
vested pension plan, I cannot find that enough was done to
effectuate the settlement which the Union alleges.

It seems to

me that in the case of a discharge, where subsequent agreement
has been reached which vitiates or mitigates that penalty, the
settlement agreement should be clear, preferably in writing.
The

traditional approach in settling grievances is for the

parties to either enter into a written settlement stipulation
or to adjust the employees' records accordingly, or to express
to each other clearly and unconditionally

in the course of a

grievance meeting what the settlement is to be so that there
is no reasonable room for later misunderstanding.

I cannot

find the casual remark of the Company representative, made outside of the grievance meeting setting, and not thereafter
formalized either in writing or in the records of the grievants,
or in a more formal meeting between representatives of the
parties, to meet the evidentiary test of a settlement.

Accord-

ingly I must reject the Union's contention that the Company
agreed to withdraw the grievant's discharge and permit him
instead to retire.

Rather I find that the discharge was neither

-6-

revoked nor modified, but that in addition thereto the Company
informed the Union that the grievant was entitled to certain
vested rights under the pension plan even though he was discharged for cause.
The Union also charges that the grievant was unfairly
treated because other employees, who at one time were discharged
for cause, were permitted to retire instead and received benefits
accorded normal retirees.

For whatever reason those cases are

distinguishable from the instant matter.

In each, either

because of the unilateral action by the Company, or perhaps as
a result of the Union's influence, the employee was permitted
to return to the Company's employ before retiring.

By returning

to the Company's employ, and as indicated in their employment
records, those discharges were revoked.

Each employee became

again, for a short period of time or otherwise, employees in
good standing, and hence eligible for retirement with the
benefits available to retirees under the contract and the welfare
plan.

Though the Union raises the suggestion, there is no

evidence in the record to support a finding that those other
cases involved fictitious, or "bookkeeping" revocations of the
discharges for the sole purpose of permitting the affected
employee to retire with full benefits.

As indicated, I do not

know why those employees were so treated.

But, in the absence

of probative evidence one way or the other bona fide reasons
are as much a possibility as otherwise.

Moreover, at least

-7-

in those cases there is some formal indication in the records
showing the transformation of the employee's status from
discharge, to reinstatement, to retirement.

In the case of

the grievant, despite the casual discussion previously mentioned
regarding the grievant's retirement rights, there is no formal
record or any other persuasive evidence that the Company had
agreed to or did reinstate him prior to his retirement.
Accordingly I do not find the cited cases of other employees
who were first discharged and then permitted to retire to be
either precedential or a practice determinative of the instant
dispute.
For all the foregoing reasons the grievance of Thomas
J. Slane is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Trustees, New York City Taxicab Industry
Local 3036, AFL-CIO Benefit Fund

AWARD

and
Utrecht Service Corporation

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the contract
between the above named parties, and having duly considered the
evidence presented at the duly noticed hearing of September 2nd,
1973 makes the following AWARD:
As of June 30, 1973 Utrecht Service
Corporation is delinquent in payment
to and owes the New York City Taxicab Industry, Local 3036, AFL-CIO
Benefit Fund the sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN DOLLARS AND SIX CENTS
($18,216.06).
Accordingly said Employer is directed to
pay said amount to the Fund forthwith.

fy/Schmertz
mw m-iM~m&

f

«_

m

r

DATED:
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York)'

t*

•^^

Impartial Chairman

On this
' *^»
day of November, 1973, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
known to me to be the individual described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'

Federation of University Employees
Local No. 35, AFL-CIO

'
'
1

and

Award

'

Yale University

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated May 1, 1971 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as
follows:
The work performed by Elizabeth Godlewski falls
substantively within the job classification Pantry Worker Labor Grade 1. Effective the date
of this Award the job may be so classified and
so paid.
However, from October 2, 1972 to the date of this
Award Elizabeth Godlewski is entitled to the
classification Head Pantry Worker and shall be
paid at the labor grade 6 rate for that period
of time.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: January 28, 1974
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 28th day of January, 1974, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Federation of University Employees
Local No. 35, AFL-CIO
Opinion

and
Yale University

The stipulated issue is:
Has the University violated Sections 2.1, 2.10, 10.1,
10.5 and 21.3 of the contract in connection with the
job title and rate of pay of Elizabeth Godlewski?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
More simply the issue is twofold.

First, whether the

job being performed by Mrs. Godlewski is properly classified
as Pantry Worker Grade 1, or whether, as the Union contends,
it should be Head Pantry Worker Labor Grade 6.

And second,

based on that determination or otherwise, whether she has been
properly paid since she assumed the job.
Hearings were held in New Haven, Connecticut on August 2
and October 3, 1973 at which time Mrs. Godlewski, hereinafter
referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the
above named Union and University appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross examine witnesses.
was expressly waived.

The Arbitrator's oath

The Union and the University filed post

hearing briefs.
I conclude that the duties which the grievant performs
are not at the Head Pantry Worker level.

I agree with the

University's assertion that the nature of the work changed
prior to the grievant's appointment to the job, and that the

- 2 duties and responsibilities do not now exceed the level of
Pantry Worker Labor Grade 1.
My conclusions are based on a comparison of the job descriptions of Head Pantry Worker and Pantry Worker, the testimony regarding the actual performance of work within those
classifications and my observations of employees at work in
those classifications during my visit to various job locations as part of the hearing.
The level of any job classification involves, of course,
the actual work being performed.

But that is not all.

It

also includes, especially where there are job descriptions,
duties which employees may be required to perform. It is not
uncommon to find labor grade and wage differentials based in
part at least on differences between required duties, even if
all such duties are not actually performed at any given time.
That is the situation here.

There may not be major differ-

ences between the routine work performed by the grievant in
the Labor Grade 1 Pantry Worker classification and what Head
Pantry Workers routinely do at the different and singly placed
locations which the Arbitrator visited.

By her own testimony

the grievant does not perform or is not responsible for some
of the specific items which differentiate the Head Pantry Worker classification from the Pantry Worker.

And though the Head

Pantry Workers observed may not routinely perform all the
additional duties delineated in their job descriptions, they
are responsible for doing so when and if assigned.

And that

is one reason they enjoy a higher classification and are paid
more.

- 3 Specifically, by example, a Head Pantry Worker may be
required to "direct all employees assigned to his/her section;
plan, lay out and assign work schedule and duties; assist in
production, menu planning, quality control, safety, sanitation, preventive maintenance, and employee performance; maintain records and perform other clerical duties ...; and train
lower labor grade employees..."

While those classified as

Head Pantry Workers may not routinely perform all of these
duties, which by job description distinguish the Head Pantry
worker from Pantry Worker, I cannot conclude that the grievant, in her present capacity, performs these duties within the
meaning of the Head Pantry Worker classification.

I agree with

Arbitrator Roberts that a test of the level of a job classification is the work performed, but clearly that is not the
only test.

Another significant factor is that a Head Pantry

Worker may be required to assume and perform these additional
duties whereas the Pantry Worker can not.

In the instant case,

in the absence of evidence that the grievant performs particular duties unique to the Head Pantry Worker classification within the meaning of that classification, she is not entitled to
the higher Labor Grade 6 status, merely because those classified at Labor Grade 6 are not routinely performing all or some
of those special duties.
case.

That is the frailty of the Union's

It has demonstrated in part at least that employees

classified as Head Pantry Workers are not presently performing
all or some of the duties which separate the two job classifications, but it has not shown to my satisfaction that the griev-

- 4 ant is performing those duties or would be expected to do so
under present procedures and at her present location on or
near the cafeteria line of the Commons main dining hall.
However, I deem that the University's unilateral action in
changing the job level from Labor Grade 6 when held by Margaret
Harty to Labor Grade 1 when the job was assumed by the grievant,
to be a change in labor grade and a revision of the job within
the meaning of Section 2.10 Paragraph (b) of the contract.
Accordingly the new and lower labor grade assignment must
be held in abeyance until sustained by arbitration if challenged by the Union unless agreed otherwise by the University and
the Union.

The instant grievance constitutes such a challenge

and therefore the University had no right to change the labor
grade level from 6 to 1 until the instant arbitration was completed and an Award favorable to the University's substantive
position rendered.
Therefore, effective the date of this Award the grievant's
classification and rate of pay may be changed respectively to
Pantry Worker and Labor Grade 1.

But from October 2, 1972 to

the date of the instant Award she is entitled to the classification Head Pantry Worker and to the Labor Grade 6 rate of pay.
That entitlement is based on an additional circumstance.
The grievant had every reasonable ground to believe that the
job was and would remain at the higher level.
the job on her own initiative.
University.

She did not seek

She was asked to take it by the

Her immediate predecessor in the job was classi-

fied as Head Pantry Worker and was paid at the Labor Grade 6

- 5 rate.

The University did not tell her that it considered the

job duties to have changed, nor did it tell her that the rate
of pay would be reduced to Labor Grade 1.

Only after she was

on the job (following transfer from another labor grade 1
position) was its classification and rate of pay reduced. The
instant grievance was filed as a consequence.

Manifestly if

theUniversity asks an employee to assume a job vacancy which
was previously occupied at the Labor Grade 6 level and it
fails to expressly inform the new appointee of any significant
change in the job duties which would reduce the Labor Grade and
the rate of pay, and where as a consequence the appointee
reasonably believes that the classification and pay rate will
continue as it existed previously, the University is estopped
from making a downward adjustment the way it did in the instant case.
In short the University had the duty to inform the grievant, before she accepted the job, that it would be at a lower
labor grade; for certainly that would have been a material
consideration in her decision to accept or reject it.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

